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Abstract 
This dissertation investigates the performance of hedge funds and actively managed U.S. 
equity mutual funds. 
The first chapter examines the relation between hedge funds and the low beta anomaly. 
Different conditions in the mutual fund and hedge fund industries should lead to different 
approaches with respect to the low beta anomaly. I find that, unlike most mutual funds, the average 
hedge fund tends to benefit considerably from the anomaly. About 2.3% per year of apparent alpha 
for the average hedge fund can be attributed to the low beta anomaly rather than manager skill. 
Low skill managers are the most reliant on the anomaly to generate returns, with the most reliant 
underperforming the least reliant by 5.9% per year. 
The second chapter uses machine learning to dynamically identify and optimally combine 
the predictors of hedge fund performance. The portfolio formed based on the machine learning 
models has an out-of-sample alpha of 7.8% per year. The importance of each predictor varies over 
time, but among the 22 predictors I consider, the consistently important predictors are average 
return, maximum return, alpha, systematic risk, and beta activity. Machine learning provides 
valuable, unique information about future hedge fund performance that is not captured by 
individual predictors. 
The third chapter studies whether the quality of fund risk management can predict fund 
performance. I find that the risk management skills of mutual fund managers—as quantified by 
their funds’ maximum drawdowns—are persistent and predictive of subsequent risk-adjusted 
performance. Funds with relatively strong past performance and relatively low past maximum 
drawdowns have, on average, an out-of-sample alpha of 2.68% per year. That alpha is magnified 
when markets are turbulent—a time during which risk management skills should be most valuable. 
Investors are averse to drawdown risk. After controlling for typical measures of past performance, 
fund flows are still a decreasing function of maximum drawdowns, particularly among investors 
with greater risk aversion and during times of generally heightened risk aversion. 
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Chapter 1. Do Hedge Funds Bet Against Beta? 
Alexey Malakhov, Timothy B. Riley, Qing Yan 
1.1. Introduction 
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) assumes all investors can use leverage to achieve 
their optimal portfolio given their risk preferences, but many investors face constraints on leverage. 
Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) contend that leverage constrained investors will overweight high 
beta assets in their portfolios, which will cause high beta assets to be overpriced relative to low 
beta assets. To capture this low beta anomaly—which was first shown empirically for U.S. equities 
in the early 1970s—Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) construct pricing factors that long a leveraged 
portfolio of low beta assets and short a deleveraged portfolio of high beta assets.1 While there is 
debate about the actual mechanism that causes the low beta anomaly, the betting-against-beta 
(BAB) factors still generate economically and statistically significant positive average returns 
across many different asset classes and countries.2 
The relation between mutual funds and the low beta anomaly has received extensive study. 
Baker, Bradley, and Wurgler (2011) argue that the combination of a leverage constraint and a 
mandate to beat a fixed benchmark will discourage an institutional investor from capitalizing on 
the anomaly. Christoffersen and Simutin (2017) find that domestic equity mutual funds, which are 
subject to leverage constraints and benchmark mandates, tend to tilt their portfolios toward high 
beta stocks to increase the probability of beating their benchmark. Consistent with that result, both 
Karceski (2002) and Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) show evidence that domestic equity mutual 
funds tend to hold stocks with betas greater than one. Similarly, Choi and Kronlund (2018) find 
 
1 For early evidence of the low beta anomaly, see, for example, Friend and Blume (1970); Black, Jensen, and Scholes 
(1972); and Haugen and Heins (1972, 1975). 
2 Cederburg and O’Doherty (2016); Hong and Sraer (2016); Bali, Brown, Murray, and Tang (2017); Liu, Stambaugh, 
and Yuan (2018); and Han (2019), among others, propose alternative explanations for the low beta anomaly. 
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that corporate bond mutual funds tend to tilt their portfolios toward higher yielding bonds. While 
this tendency should not generate true alpha, it is rational from the perspective of mutual fund 
managers. Sensoy (2009) shows that a mutual fund’s performance relative to its fixed benchmark 
has a large effect on net asset flows, and Lee, Trzcinka, and Venkatesan (2019) find that same 
performance is frequently linked to a mutual fund manager’s compensation. 
In this paper, we consider the relation between hedge funds and the low beta anomaly. The 
conditions of the hedge fund industry are significantly different from those of the mutual fund 
industry. First, unlike mutual funds, hedge funds have the tools necessary to take advantage of the 
low beta anomaly. Hedge funds are less leverage constrained than mutual funds and less restricted 
with regard to short selling. Ang, Gorovyy, and van Inwegen (2011) show that the average hedge 
fund uses substantial leverage, while mutual funds are subject to strict regulatory leverage 
constraints.3 Consequently, hedge funds are able—if they choose—to capitalize on the low beta 
anomaly by leveraging positions that are long low beta assets and short high beta assets. 
Second, unlike mutual funds, hedge funds have managers with greater incentive to take 
advantage of the low beta anomaly. Rather than the fixed benchmark driven compensation 
common to mutual funds managers (Ma, Tang, and Gomez, 2019, and DeWoody, 2019), hedge 
fund managers are typically compensated using a 2/20 fee structure, conditional on high water 
marks and hurdle rates. Moreover, Agarwal, Green, and Ren (2018) show that investors making 
capital allocations often treat hedge fund returns attributable to non-traditional factor exposures as 
alpha.4 Cochrane (2011, pg. 1087) illustrates this point as follows: 
I tried telling a hedge fund manager, “You don’t have alpha. Your returns can be replicated 
with a value-growth, momentum, currency and term carry, and short-vol strategy.” He 
 
3 The use of leverage by mutual funds is limited under Section 18 of the Investment Company Act of 1940. 
4 In this respect, mutual fund and hedge fund investors are similar as mutual fund investors also tend to treat some 




said, “‘Exotic beta’ is my alpha. I understand those systematic factors and know how to 
trade them. My clients don’t.” 
 
Considering their personal compensation structure and their investors’ behavior, hedge fund 
managers should have a strong incentive to focus on generating absolute returns, rather than the 
relative returns that are the focus for mutual fund managers. Since strategies based on the low beta 
anomaly can be expected to generate positive absolute returns, hedge fund managers should 
choose—if able—to capitalize on the anomaly. Given both their ability and their incentive to 
capitalize, we hypothesize that hedge funds will tend to “bet against beta.”5 
We begin our analysis of that hypothesis by examining whether a broad ‘All Assets’ BAB 
factor is relevant for hedge funds. Specifically, we add that BAB factor to the Fung and Hsieh 
(2004) eight-factor hedge fund model and use LASSO (least absolute shrinkage and selection 
operator) regressions to select the relevant factors for each hedge fund in our sample.6 We find 
that the BAB factor has a higher probability of being selected as relevant than all but one of the 
Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors (the emerging markets factor). When the BAB factor is selected, 
the hedge fund’s exposure to the factor is positive about 94% of the time. That is, consistent with 
our hypothesis, hedge funds do tend to “bet against beta.” 
Accounting for the BAB exposures of hedge funds has a noticeable effect on measures of 
performance. The alpha of an equal weight portfolio of all hedge funds decreases by 2.3% per year 
after adding the BAB factor to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model. As of the first quarter of 2018, 
the hedge fund industry managed about $3.2 trillion.7 Therefore, about $73 billion dollars in 
 
5 Arguments based on the leverage aspect of our theory have also been put forth to explain why other investors tend 
to “bet against beta.” For example, Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) show that private equity funds tend to have a beta 
less than one, and Frazzini, Kabiller, and Pedersen (2018) show a large, positive BAB exposure for Berkshire 
Hathaway. 
6 LASSO regression is introduced in Tibshirani (1996) and Efron, Hastie, Johnstone, and Tibshirani (2004). 




apparent alpha generated by hedge funds each year can be attributed to positive BAB exposure. 
While Ibbotson, Chen, and Zhu (2011) suggest an alpha of 3.0% per year for the average hedge 
fund, we find a statistically insignificant post-BAB average alpha of 1.6% per year. Our results 
here match prior work showing that the alpha of the average hedge fund is often overstated (for 
instance, Malkiel and Saha, 2005; Aragon, 2007; Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai, 2008; and 
Aiken, Clifford, and Ellis, 2013). While we are not the first to document that accounting for BAB 
exposure decreases the average hedge fund alpha (see Joenvaara, Kauppila, Kosowski, and 
Tolonen, 2019), we are the first to build and empirically investigate a conceptual framework 
explaining that result.8  
Along those lines, the results for hedge funds stand in contrast to those for actively 
managed mutual funds with ‘traditional’ strategies, such as domestic equity and fixed income. We 
find that the alpha of an equal weight portfolio of all ‘traditional’ mutual funds is unaffected by 
adding the BAB factor to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model. LASSO regressions do not even select 
the BAB factor as relevant, which implies that the average ‘traditional’ mutual fund derives neither 
significant costs nor benefits from the low beta anomaly. However, among the relatively small 
number of mutual funds following hedge-fund-like ‘alternative’ strategies, such as absolute return 
and market neutral, the results are similar to those for hedge funds—albeit economically and 
statistically weaker. An equal weight portfolio of all ‘alternative’ mutual funds has a large, positive 
BAB exposure, which when accounted for decreases the portfolio’s alpha by about 1.4% per year. 
Considering that ‘alternative’ mutual funds often resemble hedge funds in benchmark (e.g., a 
positive return) and investment restrictions (e.g., more use of leverage, derivatives, and shorting), 
 
8 We provide more detail on the differences between our paper and Joenvaara, Kauppila, Kosowski, and Tolonen 
(2019) in Section 4. 
5 
 
that result is consistent with the idea that weakening a combination of barriers will allow an 
institutional investor to capitalize on the low beta anomaly.9 
 We further hypothesize that the tendency to “bet against beta” will be strongest among 
hedge fund managers with relatively low skill. Given that hedge fund investors often treat returns 
generated through exotic factor exposures as alpha, relatively low skill hedge fund managers 
should have the incentive to generate returns through BAB exposure to compensate for not being 
able to generate true alpha.10 That behavior would be aligned with the findings of Titman and Tiu 
(2011)—who show that relatively low skill hedge fund managers are more reliant on factor 
exposures to generate returns—and Sun, Wang, and Zheng (2012)—who find the same low skill 
managers also choose to pursue less unique strategies. It would, however, run counter to the 
positive relation between hedge fund systematic risk and alpha shown by Bali, Brown, and 
Caglayan (2012). 
Because the true skill of a hedge fund manager is unobservable, we begin our analysis of 
this hypothesis by using a hedge fund’s past performance as a proxy for skill. We find a large and 
highly statistically significant exposure to the BAB factor in the bottom decile of funds sorted by 
past performance, while the BAB exposure of funds in the top decile is much smaller and not 
statistically significant. The alpha of an equal weight portfolio of worst performers decreases by a 
statistically significant 3.7% per year after adding the BAB factor to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) 
model, while the decrease in alpha for an equal weight portfolio of best performers is a statistically 
insignificant 1.3% per year. Hence, consistent with our hypothesis, the worst performing (and 
 
9 While ‘alternative’ mutual funds must still comply with all U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules, 
they typically have fewer institutional restrictions, which can often be numerous and binding (see, for example, 
Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman, 2004). 
10 Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) argue that, in equilibrium, alpha is unrelated to skill, but (i) their model is subject 
to significant debate—particularly with respect to diseconomies of scale (e.g., Phillips, Pukthuanthong, and Rau, 2018, 
and Adams, Hayunga, and Mansi, 2018)—and (ii) their model is specifically focused on the mutual fund industry. In 
our analysis, we operate from the traditional viewpoint that there is a positive relation between alpha and skill. 
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presumably the lowest skill) hedge fund managers rely the most on the low beta anomaly to 
generate returns. 
The arguments above also suggest that BAB exposure itself should signal skill: a large 
BAB exposure can indicate an attempt by a relatively low skill hedge fund manager to substitute 
for true alpha. Therefore, we further our analysis by considering the predictive power of a hedge 
fund’s BAB exposure. Jordan and Riley (2015) find that, among domestic equity mutual funds, 
those that invest in relatively low risk stocks outperform those that invest in relatively high risk 
stocks if standard evaluation models are used. However, they also show that the apparent 
difference in performance is eliminated if the models are modified to account for the low beta 
anomaly. In contrast, we find in a similar test that accounting for the low beta anomaly does not 
eliminate, but rather reveals, hedge fund alpha. 
Using the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model, an equal weight portfolio of hedge funds in the 
lowest decile of past BAB exposure does not outperform an equal weight portfolio of hedge funds 
in the highest decile. But after the BAB factor is added to that model, the lowest decile portfolio 
outperforms the highest decile portfolio by a substantial margin of 5.9% per year. To understand 
the economic size of that result, note that the S&P 500 had an average total return of 5.8% per year 
over the same time period (January 1998 through March 2012). The large difference in 
performance that appears between the two portfolios when BAB exposure is not treated as alpha 
supports the idea that a hedge fund’s BAB exposure can signal managerial skill, with high BAB 
exposures prevalent among managers with relatively low skill. 
Subsequent analyses using models styled after Henriksson and Merton (1981) show that 
hedge funds in the highest decile of past BAB exposure successfully time the BAB factor. 
Nevertheless, even after accounting for the gains from BAB factor timing, the performance of the 
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highest decile portfolio is still poor compared to the lowest decile portfolio. Despite not generating 
any returns from timing the BAB factor, the lowest decile portfolio still has an average total return 
from active management—the sum of the returns from all timing and non-timing related active 
management decisions—that is 4.9% per year greater than that of the highest decile portfolio. More 
generally, the lowest decile portfolio delivers a greater average excess return and Sharpe ratio 
compared to the highest decile portfolio.11 All of these performance differences are consistent with 
the prior evidence suggesting that high BAB exposure is a signal of relatively low hedge fund 
manager skill. 
 Further supporting that claim, we find that a substantial portion of hedge funds’ BAB 
factor timing is achieved using public information, rather than unique managerial insight. Frazzini 
and Pedersen (2014) document a negative relation between the lagged level of the TED spread—
a proxy for funding constraint tightness—and the return on the BAB factor. While hedge funds in 
the lowest past BAB exposure decile portfolio show some evidence of modifying their BAB 
exposure based on the lagged TED spread, we observe that the hedge funds in the highest decile 
portfolio make relatively large modifications consistent with public-information-based timing. 
When the lagged TED spread is relatively high, the BAB exposure of the highest decile portfolio 
is 0.59, but when the lagged TED spread is relatively low, the exposure is 1.30. If we accept Ferson 
and Schadt’s (1996, pg. 428) argument that returns from public-information-based timing should 
not be treated as alpha “because investors can replicate on their own any strategy which depends 
on public information,” then the lowest decile portfolio outperforms the highest decile portfolio 
by over 6% per year, regardless of the lagged TED spread. That result adds additional support to 
the idea that relatively low skill hedge fund managers tend to use a large amount of BAB exposure. 
 
11 The highest past BAB exposure decile portfolio has an annualized average excess return of 4.3% and a Sharpe ratio 
of 0.45. The same values for the lowest past BAB exposure decile portfolio are 6.3% and 0.64. 
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As a whole, it is clear that hedge funds “bet against beta.” Many hedge funds favor low 
beta assets over high beta assets, while almost no hedge funds show the opposite preference. As a 
result, the performance of the average hedge fund is significantly overstated by models that fail to 
account for the low beta anomaly. Reliance on the anomaly to generate returns is most prevalent 
among relatively low skill hedge fund managers, which suggests that much of those hedge funds’ 
already low apparent alpha is not alpha at all. 
1.2. Data and methods 
1.2.1. Hedge fund sample 
Following Duanmu, Malakhov, and McCumber (2018), we use Bloomberg to collect 
extensive hedge fund data from 1994 to 2015. The data includes monthly net returns and common 
characteristics, such as assets under management and style.12 Like other databases, hedge funds 
report data to Bloomberg on voluntary basis, although Bloomberg requires that all reporting funds 
provide performance since inception. To reduce backfill bias, we drop the first 24 months of each 
fund’s returns.13 We include both live and defunct funds in our sample to control for survivorship 
bias, and we remove all funds of funds. The BAB factor that we use in all of our tests is only 
available through March 2012, so our sample period is January 1996 through March 2012. The 
final sample contains 10,095 unique funds and 456,861 fund-month observations. 
1.2.2. Mutual fund sample 
We use the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Survivor-Bias-Free U.S. Mutual 
Fund database to build our sample of actively managed mutual funds. We exclude any fund that 
CRSP identifies as an index fund, ETF, or variable annuity; drop all funds of funds and money 
 
12 Hedge fund returns are calculated from fund net asset values (NAVs) converted into U.S. dollars. 
13 The date upon which a hedge fund first reports data to Bloomberg is unavailable. Therefore, we do not know the 
exact number of backfilled returns for any given fund. The 24-month correction is consistent with both Jagannathan, 
Malakhov, and Novikov (2010) and Titman and Tiu (2011). 
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market funds; and only include a fund in our sample once it is at least two years old and has at 
some point reached at least $20 million in assets (to address the incubation bias identified by Evans, 
2010). Multiple share classes of a mutual fund are collapsed into a single fund with (i) fund assets 
being the sum of the assets across all share classes and (ii) all other fund characteristics, including 
net return, being asset-weighted averages of the share class values.14 We match the time period for 
our mutual fund sample to that of the hedge fund sample—January 1996 through March 2012—
which results in it having 8,387 unique funds and 831,772 fund-month observations.  
We subdivide the full sample of actively managed mutual funds into ‘alternative’ and 
‘traditional’ groups based on the fund’s investment strategy. The funds in the ‘alternative’ group 
follow hedge-fund-like strategies and are identified based on Lipper classification.15 All funds not 
identified as ‘alternative’ are placed in the ‘traditional’ group. Funds in the ‘traditional’ group can 
be broadly classified using CRSP objective codes as either domestic equity (43% of the ‘traditional’ 
sample), foreign equity (13%), fixed income (34%), or mixed/other (10%). The ‘alternative’ group 
has 223 unique funds and 14,152 fund-month observations, and the ‘traditional’ group has 8,164 
unique funds and 817,620 fund-month observations. 
1.2.3. Measuring fund performance 
We use the Fung and Hsieh (2004) eight-factor hedge fund model (henceforth, the FH8 
model) as the baseline for evaluating fund performance: 
 𝑟 − 𝑟𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑃500 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑀𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽410𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟




14 The net returns we consider in our analysis of mutual funds do not reflect any effects from front- or back-end loads. 
15 Specifically, a mutual fund is considered ‘alternative’ if it uses any of the following Lipper classifications: ABR, 
ACF, AED, AGM, ALT, AMS, BBBL, CMS, DL, DSB, EMN, LSE, MFF, SESE, or SFI.   
10 
 
𝑟 is the monthly net return of a given fund, 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free rate (proxied by the return on 30-day 
US Treasury bills), and 𝛼 is the fund’s alpha. The included factors are:  
(1) 𝑆𝑃500, the S&P 500 index return minus the risk-free rate; 
(2) 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑, the Russell 2000 index return minus the S&P 500 index return; 
(3) 𝐸𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑀𝑘𝑡, the MSCI Emerging Market index return minus the risk-free rate;16  
(4) 10𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟, the 10-year U.S. Treasury bond portfolio return minus the risk-free rate; 
(5) 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 , the Citi BBB corporate bond index return minus the Fama U.S. 
Treasury bond portfolio return; 
(6) 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 , 𝐹𝑥𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 , and 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 , three trend-following factors constructed 
from lookback straddles on futures contracts on bonds, currencies, and commodities.17 
All the data on returns is from CRSP and Bloomberg, while the three trend-following factors are 
courtesy of David Hsieh.18 
To evaluate the relation between funds and the low beta anomaly, we modify that baseline 
model by adding the Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) betting-against-beta factor (henceforth, the 
FH8+BAB model): 
 𝑟 − 𝑟𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑃500 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑀𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽410𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟
+ 𝛽5𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑+𝛽7𝐹𝑥𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑+𝛽8𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑+𝛽9𝐵𝐴𝐵 + 𝜀 
(1.2) 
𝐵𝐴𝐵 is the monthly return on a portfolio constructed by longing a leveraged portfolio of low beta 
assets and shorting a deleveraged portfolio of high beta assets. 
 
16 EmergMkt was not added into the model until Edelman, Fung, Hsieh, and Naik (2012). As shown in our later results, 
EmergMkt is an important factor in explaining the returns of the average hedge fund. 
17 See Fung and Hsieh (2001) for more information on the trend-following factors. 




Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) construct a variety of BAB factors using different assets 
classes and markets. Given the broad diversification of hedge funds, we use their ‘All Assets’ BAB 
factor in our analysis.19 Prior work—focusing on the ‘U.S. Equity’ BAB factor rather than the ‘All 
Assets’ BAB factor—has disagreed on whether the BAB factor is investable. For example, Auer 
and Schuhmacher (2015, pg. 30) claim a BAB-based strategy can be successfully implemented 
using only “the 30 highly liquid stocks of the Dow Jones Industrial Average,” while Novy-Marx 
and Velikov (2016, 2019) claim that a successful BAB-based strategy cannot be implemented 
because of a necessary overreliance on small-cap and micro-cap stocks.20 By examining net-of-fee 
returns experienced by actual investors rather than hypothetical portfolios, we can examine 
whether generating significant BAB exposure is possible, regardless of whether the exact BAB 
factor can be inexpensively purchased. 
 Throughout the paper, we estimate Eq. (1.1) and Eq. (1.2) using standard OLS regressions. 
We also estimate the models using a procedure designed to eliminate irrelevant factors, since not 
all of the factors in the models are relevant for all hedge funds at all points in time. To identify the 
relevant factor exposures for a given individual hedge fund or a given portfolio of hedge funds, 
we follow Li and Malakhov (2017) and first use a LASSO regression as a factor selection method. 
We then use an OLS regression to estimate the exposures to the factors selected by the LASSO 
regression. We refer to the entirety of this two-step process as a LASSO regression to differentiate 
it from the standard OLS regression. 
 
19 We thank the authors for making the returns on the ‘All Assets’ BAB factor available through March 2012 on 
Applied Quantitative Research’s (AQR’s) website. Extending forward the time-series of the factor’s returns ourselves 
is cost prohibitive. See Section 3 and Table 8 of Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) for details on the factor’s construction. 
https://www.aqr.com/Insights/Datasets/Betting-Against-Beta-Original-Paper-Data 
20 Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2020) likewise show that the returns on the BAB factor are sensitive to how the formation 
procedure handles stocks with low market capitalization.  
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1.3. The exposures of individual hedge funds to the BAB factor 
Our examination of whether the BAB factor is an important factor for hedge funds begins 
by using LASSO regressions to select the relevant factors for each fund. Specifically, we start by 
requiring that each fund have at least 24 monthly return observations, which leaves us with 6,163 
unique funds. We then run a LASSO regression on each fund’s full return history using the 
FH8+BAB model. Figure 1.1 shows how often each of the nine factors in the model is selected by 
the LASSO regressions and whether the resulting factor exposure is positive or negative. 
Indicating the factor’s importance in explaining hedge fund returns, the BAB factor is selected for 
36% of hedge funds, which is more frequent than all other factors, except for the emerging market 
factor. Indicating whether hedge funds bet for or against beta, among the funds for which the BAB 
factor is selected, about 94% have a positive exposure (i.e., when betting, hedge funds tend to “bet 
against beta”). 
Next, we assess the distribution of BAB exposure within the hedge fund industry. To 
generate that distribution, we run OLS regressions on the same set of funds using the same model. 
Figure 1.2 shows that there is significant variation in BAB exposure across funds, but that most 
funds have a positive exposure. After trimming the distribution at the 1% level, BAB exposure 
varies between −2.0 and 3.2; however, about 52% of funds have an exposure between 0.0 and 1.0 
and another 24% have an exposure greater than 1.0. Untabulated results show that BAB exposure 
has a mean of 0.51, a median of 0.39, and a standard deviation of 0.80. 
We evaluate the statistical significance of the above BAB exposures in Figure 1.3. Among 
the 76% of hedge funds with a positive exposure to the BAB factor, about 49% are statistically 
significant at the 10% level. Put another way, about 37% (=0.76 x 0.49) of hedge funds have a 
statistically significant positive BAB exposure. In comparison, only 3% of hedge funds have a 
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statistically significant negative BAB exposure. Like in Figure 1.1, if the results in Figures 1.2 and 
1.3 are considered in combination, it is clear that the BAB factor is an important factor for hedge 
funds and that hedge funds typically have a positive BAB exposure. 
1.4. The performance of the average hedge fund after accounting for the BAB factor 
Given the relevance of the BAB factor in explaining hedge funds’ returns, it is reasonable 
to expect that accounting for BAB exposure would meaningfully impact hedge funds’ alphas. To 
test the effect on performance of accounting for the BAB factor, we create an equal weight 
portfolio of all hedge funds and measure its alpha using both the FH8 model and the FH8+BAB 
model. Table 1.1 reports the results from this analysis using both LASSO regressions and OLS 
regressions. Since, in this instance, the results are very similar across those methods, we only 
discuss the LASSO regression results. 
The BAB factor is selected by the LASSO regression as relevant for the portfolio, and the 
portfolio has a large, positive exposure to the factor of 0.40 (t-stat = 6.10). The magnitude of the 
BAB factor’s exposure is more than double that of any other selected factor. Adding the BAB 
factor to the model decreases the alpha of the portfolio from 0.30% per month (t-stat = 3.71) to 
0.12% per month (t-stat = 1.43). That difference amounts to a decrease in alpha of 2.3% per year 
(t-stat = 2.32). Total hedge fund industry assets were about $3.2 trillion in the first quarter of 2018, 
which suggests that about $73 billion per year in apparent alpha can be attributed to hedge funds’ 
positive exposure to the BAB factor.21 The statistically insignificant alpha of about 1.4% per year 
that remains for the average hedge fund after accounting for the BAB factor may still overstate 
performance as the FH8 model tends to produce upward biased alphas (Bhardwaj, Gorton, and 
Rouwenhorst, 2014). 
 




Our results to this point run counter to Blitz’s (2018) claim that hedge funds actually bet 
on, rather than against, beta.22 Our results, however, are consistent with Joenvaara, Kauppila, 
Kosowski, and Tolonen (2019), who find that the average hedge fund has a positive exposure to a 
‘Global Equity’ BAB factor.23 While similar in limited respects, we note that the overall goal and 
findings of our paper are very different from Joenvaara, Kauppila, Kosowski, and Tolonen (2019). 
Our focus is the relation between hedge funds and the low beta anomaly, while they briefly 
evaluate the BAB factor as part of an analysis focused on the sensitivity of results to hedge fund 
database choices. Regarding the potential overlap, our study differs from theirs in both execution 
and results. In terms of execution, when testing the BAB factor, we use a different base factor 
model (augmented global Carhart, 1997, vs. Fung and Hsieh, 2004) and a much broader BAB 
factor (‘Global Equity’ vs. ‘All Assets’).24,25 In terms of results, we find both a larger average BAB 
exposure (0.11 vs. 0.40) and a larger impact on alpha (1.3% per year vs. 2.3% per year). 
1.5. The performance of the average mutual fund after accounting for the BAB factor 
We previously argued that, unlike mutual funds, hedge funds have both the ability and 
incentive to capitalize on the low beta anomaly. Here, we evaluate the extent to which ability and 
incentive matter by replicating the analysis from the prior section using two distinct groups of 
 
22 The results in Blitz (2018) do not hold in our sample. We find in untabulated results that including our replication 
of his ‘Low Volatility – High Volatility’ factor in the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model has no effect on the alpha of an 
equal weight portfolio of all hedge funds. The factor loading itself is not statistically significant. 
23 More generally, our results are consistent with prior work showing that hedge funds are able to identify and take 
advantage of mispricing. See, for example, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004); Kokkonen and Suominen (2015); Sias, 
Turtle, and Zykaj (2016); Caglayan, Celiker, and Sonaer (2018); Cao, Chen, Goetzmann, and Liang (2018); and Cao, 
Liang, Lo, and Petrasek (2018). 
24 If we reperform our previous analysis using the global Carhart (1997) model; the augmented global Carhart (1997) 
model (excluding the ‘Global Equity’ BAB factor); the U.S. Carhart (1997) model; or the Cremers, Petajisto, and 
Zitzewitz (2013) seven-factor model as our baseline, we still find that hedge funds have a positive exposure to the ‘All 
Assets’ BAB factor that when accounted for substantially decreases alpha. We also still find the same trend in BAB 
exposure that we discuss in the next section. 
25 Untabulated analysis that includes both BAB factors in the FH8 model shows that the average hedge fund has a 
larger exposure to the ‘All Assets’ BAB factor (0.08 vs. 0.26). Placing just the ‘Global Equity’ BAB factor into the 
FH8 model leaves the alpha of the average fund positive and statistically significant. 
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mutual funds: those with ‘traditional’ strategies and those with ‘alternative’ strategies. Because of 
the conditions under which ‘traditional’ mutual funds operate, we do not expect them to take 
advantage of the low beta anomaly through positive exposure to the BAB factor. However, among 
the hedge-fund-like ‘alternative’ mutual funds, who are subject to fewer investment constraints 
and pursue absolute returns, we expect a tendency toward positive BAB exposure (although that 
tendency should still be weaker than that of the even less constrained hedge funds).26 
We first form an equal weight portfolio of all ‘traditional’ mutual funds and evaluate 
performance with and without considering exposure to the BAB factor. To maintain a clean 
comparison with our previous hedge fund results, we use the FH8 model as our baseline and use 
the same time period.27 Table 1.2 reports the results from both LASSO regressions and OLS 
regressions. Consistent with our expectations, the BAB factor is of limited importance in 
explaining the performance of the average ‘traditional’ mutual fund. The BAB factor is not 
selected as relevant by the LASSO regression, and while the OLS regression does show a positive 
and statistically significant BAB exposure of 0.08 (t-stat = 2.25), the impact on alpha of accounting 
for that exposure is economically trivial and statistically insignificant (0.03% per month, t-stat = 
0.83).28,29 In addition, adding the BAB factor to the FH8 model when using the OLS regressions 
has no impact on the adjusted R2. 
 
26 See, for example, Agarwal, Boyson, and Naik (2009); Clifford, Jordan, and Riley (2013); and Huang and Wang 
(2013) for more discussion on mutual funds with ‘alternative’ strategies. 
27 The results are similar (i) if we use only domestic equity mutual funds and (ii) if we use only domestic equity mutual 
funds and replace the ‘All Assets’ BAB factor with the ‘U.S. Equity’ BAB factor. 
28 When the LASSO regressions select the same factors from both the FH8 set and the FH8+BAB set, we do not report 
differences between those results (because there are, of course, no differences). 
29 Using the augmented global Carhart (1997) hedge fund model of Joenvaara, Kauppila, Kosowski, and Tolonen 
(2019) (excluding the ‘Global Equity’ BAB factor), the exposure to the ‘All Assets’ BAB factor when using the OLS 
regressions is −0.11 (t-stat = −2.42). 
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In Table 1.3, we repeat the above tests using our sample of ‘alternative’ mutual funds.30 
Because the results from the LASSO regressions and the OLS regressions are very similar in this 
instance, we only discuss the results from the LASSO regressions. In line with our expectations, 
the BAB factor is selected by the LASSO regression as relevant for the equal weight portfolio of 
‘alternative’ mutual funds. The BAB exposure of the portfolio is 0.25 (t-stat = 7.31). After adding 
the BAB factor to the baseline FH8 model, the already negative alpha of –0.08% per month (t-stat 
= –1.81) decreases to –0.20% per month (t-stat = –4.66). That decrease in alpha of –0.12% per 
month is both statistically (t-stat = –2.76) and economically significant (–1.4% per year). Like 
hedge funds, ‘alternative’ mutual funds extensively rely on BAB exposure to generate returns, 
albeit to a lesser degree. 
In the big picture, there is a notable trend in the increasing level of BAB exposure when 
moving from ‘traditional’ mutual funds to ‘alternative’ mutual funds to hedge funds. In 
untabulated results, we find (i) that ‘alternative’ mutual funds have a BAB exposure that is 0.16 
(t-stat = 4.25) greater than that of ‘traditional’ mutual funds and (ii) that hedge funds have a BAB 
exposure that is 0.16 (t-stat = 2.62) greater than that of ‘alternative’ mutual funds. The availability 
of the necessary tools to capitalize and the incentive to capitalize on the low beta anomaly is also 
trending in the same direction. Those trends matching is consistent with our hypothesis on why 
mutual funds and hedge funds should have different approaches to the low beta anomaly. 
‘Alternative’ mutual funds occupy the middle ground between ‘traditional’ mutual funds and 
hedge funds with respect to their benchmarks and investment constraints, and consequently, they 
also occupy the middle ground with respect to BAB exposure. 
 
30 Over the sample period, there is a significant increase in the number of ‘alternative’ mutual funds. There are 23 
such funds when the sample begins and 176 when the sample ends. If the regressions are weighted by the number of 
funds in the sample in a given month, the results are similar to those presented. 
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1.6. The relation between hedge funds’ past performance and subsequent BAB exposure 
The inclusion of the BAB factor into the FH8 model causes a sizeable decrease in the alpha 
of the average hedge fund. We consider here whether the impact of the BAB factor on alpha varies 
depending on a hedge fund’s past performance. In regard to funds that have outperformed in the 
past, Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007) and Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov (2010) both find 
outperformance continues in the future. It is possible that the persistent performance of funds with 
strong past performance is driven by their exposure to the BAB factor, rather than manager skill. 
In regard to funds that have underperformed in the past, Titman and Tiu (2011) show relatively 
low skill hedge fund managers are more reliant on factor exposures to generate returns. Therefore, 
it is also possible that funds with poor past performance are heavily reliant on BAB exposure, 
rather than manager skill. 
We form two portfolios to test how accounting for the BAB factor affects the subsequent 
performance of hedge funds with past outperformance or underperformance. The ‘Top α’ portfolio 
is an equal weight portfolio of all hedge funds in the highest decile of past performance, and the 
‘Btm α’ portfolio is an equal weight portfolio of all hedge funds in the lowest decile. To measure 
past performance, we estimate an alpha for each fund at the beginning of each month using LASSO 
regression, the past 24 monthly returns, and the FH8+BAB model. These portfolios are not formed 
in the first two years of our sample period, since 24 months of past returns are not available during 
that time. 
Table 1.4 reports the alphas and factor exposures for these portfolios using both the FH8 
model and the FH8+BAB model. As before, LASSO regressions and OLS regressions are both 
considered. Using LASSO regression, the BAB factor is not selected for the ‘Top α’ portfolio. 
Accordingly, the economically large and statistically significant positive alpha of the ‘Top α’ 
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portfolio is unchanged by the addition of the BAB factor. LASSO regression does select the BAB 
factor for the ‘Btm α’ portfolio. That portfolio’s exposure to the BAB factor is 0.80 (t-stat = 
5.89)—more than three times the magnitude of the ‘Btm α’ portfolio’s next largest exposure. As a 
result of that substantial BAB exposure, adding the BAB factor to the FH8 model decreases the 
alpha of the ‘Btm α’ portfolio from economically and statistically zero to −0.27% per month (t-stat 
= −1.53).31 
Turning to the OLS regressions, the ‘Top α’ portfolio does have a positive exposure to 
BAB factor of 0.25 (t-stat = 1.52), but accounting for that exposure has a limited impact on 
conclusions about that portfolio’s performance. Alpha for the ‘Top α’ portfolio is 0.74% per month 
(t-stat = 3.70) using the FH8 model and 0.63% per month (t-stat = 3.01) using the FH8+BAB 
model. The difference in alpha of 0.11% per month between those two models is not statistically 
significant (t-stat = 0.50), and in both cases, performance still persists. Results for the ‘Btm α’ 
portfolio using OLS regressions are similar to those from using LASSO regressions. The BAB 
exposure of the ‘Btm α’ portfolio is large and positive, and accounting for that exposure decreases 
that portfolio’s alpha by 0.31% per month (t-stat = 1.73). 
The above results suggest that (i) the persistent performance of the best performing funds 
is not the result of BAB exposure and (ii) the worst performing funds do heavily rely on BAB 
exposure.32 To test the robustness of these findings, we repeated the analysis using estimates of 
past performance from OLS regressions rather than LASSO regressions and using estimates of 
past performance from the FH8 model rather than the FH8+BAB model. Results from those 
 
31 When using the LASSO regressions, we cannot always test the statistical significance of the changes from adding 
the BAB factor to the FH8 model. Such a test is possible when the LASSO regressions only add factors in the 
FH8+BAB model that were not selected in the FH8 model, but such a test is not possible when factors are 
simultaneously added and subtracted. 
32 These results do not necessarily imply an investable strategy, as Joenvaara, Kosowski, and Tolonen (2019) find that 
constraints (e.g., rebalancing frequency, minimum investment, closed-to-new-investments) keep investors from easily 
exploiting this type of hypothetical portfolio. 
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alternative specifications are consistent with those presented in Table 4. Furthermore, if we repeat 
this analysis separately for each hedge fund style (as classified by Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 
2009), the results for each style are similar to the full sample results. 
1.7. The predictive power of a hedge fund’s past BAB exposure 
In this section, we consider whether a hedge fund’s past BAB exposure itself can predict 
future performance. Titman and Tiu (2011) show that relatively high skill hedge fund managers 
rely less on factor exposures, and Sun, Wang, and Zheng (2012) find high skill managers also 
choose to pursue comparatively unique strategies. Therefore, the choice a hedge fund manager 
makes about whether or not to rely on the BAB factor to generate returns could be a signal of skill. 
If BAB exposure is a signal of skill, we would expect hedge funds that have had large, positive 
exposures to the BAB factor in the past to subsequently underperform funds that have had very 
limited past exposures (assuming the model comparing their performance does not treat BAB 
exposure as alpha). 
We form two portfolios to test the predictive power of BAB exposure. The ‘Top BAB’ 
portfolio is an equal weight portfolio of all hedge funds in the highest decile of past BAB exposure, 
and the ‘Btm BAB’ portfolio is an equal weight portfolio of all hedge funds in the lowest decile. 
BAB exposure for each fund is re-estimated at the beginning of each month using OLS regression, 
the past 24 monthly returns, and the FH8+BAB model. We employ OLS regression rather than 
LASSO regression to force a measure of BAB exposure for each fund. Instead of using the point 
estimate of BAB exposure to form the portfolios, we use the t-statistic associated with that estimate. 
This choice lessens the importance of hedge funds with large, but statistically unreliable, point 
estimates of BAB exposure. 
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Before testing the performance of the portfolios, we first evaluate whether the hedge funds 
in them differ across other dimensions. Table 1.5 reports the mean characteristics for the funds in 
the ‘Top BAB’ portfolio and the ‘Btm BAB’ portfolio. As shown, the two groups of funds are not 
statistically different in many respects, such as assets and hurdle rate; in addition, the majority of 
the differences that are statistically significant are of limited economic importance. For example, 
the hedge funds in the ‘Top BAB’ portfolio have a statistically lower average incentive fee of 
19.23%, but the average incentive fee of those in the ‘Btm BAB’ portfolio is just 19.96%. The 
similarity of the hedge funds in the two portfolios across these dimensions should provide at least 
some comfort that any differences identified in portfolio performance are related to BAB exposure, 
not other fund characteristics. 
Table 1.6 shows the performance of the ‘Top BAB’ portfolio and the ‘Btm BAB’ portfolio 
using LASSO regressions and both the FH8 model and the FH8+BAB model.33 Exposure to the 
BAB factor is persistent: the BAB factor is not selected by the LASSO regression for the ‘Btm 
BAB’ portfolio, but it is selected by the LASSO regression for the ‘Top BAB’ portfolio, with an 
exposure of 0.83 (t-stat = 8.61). The key portfolio with respect to testing our hypothesis is the one 
which longs the ‘Btm BAB’ portfolio and shorts the ‘Top BAB’ portfolio, and the key measure 
for that portfolio is its FH8+BAB model alpha. That long/short portfolio’s alpha using that model 
is 0.39% per month (t-stat = 2.29).34 Repeating the analysis using OLS regressions in Table 1.7, 
we find that, for the same portfolio, the same alpha is 0.49% per month (t-stat = 2.77). 
 
33 As explained before, statistically comparing the alphas for the ‘Btm BAB’ portfolio across the two models or the 
long/short portfolio across the two models is either unnecessary or not feasible when using LASSO regressions. We 
therefore made the choice to keep the table internally consistent and also not tabulate the statistical comparison for 
the “Top BAB” portfolio. 
34 The LASSO regressions select different sets of factors for the ‘Top BAB’, ‘Btm BAB’, and long/short portfolios, 




Hence, when the model does not treat BAB exposure as alpha, hedge funds that have had 
large, positive exposures to the BAB factor in the past do—to an economically and statistically 
significant degrees—subsequently underperform funds that have had very limited past exposures. 
That result supports our hypothesis that a hedge fund manager choosing to use a substantial amount 
of BAB exposure is a negative signal about their skill (and vice versa).  
Alternatively, that result could, perhaps, be dismissed as mechanical: the BAB factor has 
a positive average return and hedge funds’ exposures to the BAB factor are persistent, so we should 
expect the ‘Top BAB’ portfolio to underperform the ‘Btm BAB’ portfolio when the performance 
model does not treat BAB exposure as alpha. We disagree with this reasoning. While we should 
expect and do find that the alpha of the ‘Top BAB’ portfolio decreases more than the alpha of the 
‘Btm BAB’ portfolio when the performance model does not treat BAB exposure as alpha, that 
expectation does not immediately lead to the expectation that the ‘Top BAB’ portfolio should, in 
that case, underperform the ‘Btm BAB’ portfolio. If we set aside our earlier conjectures regarding 
the hedge fund industry, there is no reason that the funds in the ‘Top BAB’ portfolio could not (i) 
outperform when treating BAB exposure as alpha and (ii) outperform to a lesser extent when not 
treating BAB exposure as alpha. Put another way, there is no mechanical requirement that 
precludes hedge funds from having both large exposures to exotic factors and highly skilled 
management, such that outperformance would be found even if the performance model does not 
treat exotic exposures as alpha. 
1.8. Hedge funds’ past BAB exposures and BAB factor timing 
Past research has found that many hedge funds can time both the overall market (e.g., Chen 
and Liang, 2007) and specific factors (e.g., Cao, Chen, Liang, and Lo, 2013). Given those results, 
we consider in this section whether hedge funds can successfully time the BAB factor. In particular, 
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we focus on the possibility that the hedge funds in the ‘Top BAB’ portfolio are not simply 
maintaining a constant large exposure to the BAB factor, but rather successfully timing the BAB 
factor. If such timing is occurring, then our previous conclusions about the relatively low skill of 
hedge fund managers with large BAB exposures could be erroneous. 
 Our analysis with respect to this possibility is broken into two parts. We first consider 
whether the hedge funds in the ‘Top BAB’ or ‘Btm BAB’ portfolio successfully time the BAB 
factor and re-evaluate their performance under the assumption that any successful timing is true 
alpha. Then, we investigate the extent to which those hedge funds’ BAB factor timing is achieved 
using public information. That analysis examines the relation between the BAB exposures of the 
‘Top BAB’ and ‘Btm BAB’ portfolios and the lagged TED spread—a common measure of the 
tightness of leverage constraints that Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) show predicts subsequent BAB 
factor returns. Following Ferson and Schadt (1996), this later test does not treat returns from timing 
as alpha if the timing is based on public information, since investors could themselves replicate 
such a strategy without the aid or expense of a manager. 
1.8.1. The performance of the BAB portfolios after accounting for factor timing 
So far, neither the FH8 model nor the FH8+BAB model has allowed for factor timing. Our 
conclusions about the relatively low skill of the managers of the hedge funds in the ‘Top BAB’ 
portfolio could be an artifact of that constraint. Here, we test that possibility by re-evaluating the 
‘Top BAB’ and ‘Btm BAB’ portfolios using a model that both allows for factor timing and treats 
successful factor timing as alpha.35 
To capture factor timing, we add Henriksson and Merton (1981) style measures to the 
FH8+BAB model: 
 
35 If we evaluate the equal weight portfolio of all hedge funds, the ‘Top α’ portfolio, or the ‘Btm α’ portfolio using the 
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In this model, each 𝛽𝑖 captures the base factor exposure and each 𝛾𝑖 captures the factor timing. A 
positive 𝛾9 suggests successful timing of the BAB factor because it indicates that a fund’s BAB 
exposure is larger in periods when the BAB factor return is positive.36 𝛼′ is the average return 
from all non-timing related active management (i.e., the alpha unrelated to timing).37 We capture 
the average return from timing the Fung and Hsieh (FH) factors as: 
 








We likewise capture the average return from timing the BAB factor as: 
 






To determine the average total return from active management, we calculate: 
 𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 = 𝛼
′ + 𝑟𝐹𝐻 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑟𝐵𝐴𝐵 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 (1.6) 
Table 1.8 shows the performance of the ‘Top BAB’ and ‘Btm BAB’ portfolios using 
LASSO regressions and this timing model. Hedge funds in the ‘Top BAB’ portfolio appear to 
generate significant returns from timing the BAB factor. The exposure of the ‘Top BAB’ portfolio 
to the BAB timing factor is 0.69 (t-stat = 2.51), which generates an average return of 0.53% per 
month. The ‘Top BAB’ portfolio, however, still has an average total return from active 
management of only −0.10% per month (t-stat = −0.73). In comparison, despite generating no 
 
36 Our estimates of factor timing in this analysis could be biased downward for all tested portfolios. Goetzmann, 
Ingersoll, and Ivkovic (2000) show that Henriksson-Merton style measures are biased downward if monthly data is 
used but the portfolio manager is making timing decisions on a more frequent basis, which Patton and Ramadoria 
(2013) show is the case for hedge funds. 
37 All costs (e.g., management fees and trading expenses) are charged to 𝛼′. As a result, our estimate of 𝛼′ should be 
biased downward, while our estimates of the average returns from timing related active management should be biased 
upward. Nevertheless, the average total return from active management should have a net bias of zero. 
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returns from timing the BAB factor, the ‘Btm BAB’ portfolio has an average total return from 
active management of 0.32% per month (t-stat = 2.37). The difference in average total return from 
active management between the portfolios of 0.41% per month (t-stat = 2.38) is consistent with 
the difference in alpha of 0.39% per month (t-stat = 2.29) shown in Table 1.6. We repeat this 
analysis using OLS regressions in Table 1.9 and find similar, albeit statistically weaker, results. 
Considering the results in Tables 1.8 and 1.9 together, although hedge funds in the ‘Top 
BAB’ portfolio do successfully time the BAB factor, treating all of that successful timing as alpha 
does not change our conclusion that a hedge fund manager choosing to use a substantial amount 
of BAB exposure is a negative signal about their skill. 
1.8.2. Timing the BAB factor using publicly available information 
We next consider the extent to which the BAB factor timing of the ‘Top BAB’ and ‘Btm 
BAB’ portfolios is driven by public information and how accounting for public-information-based 
timing impacts our estimates of portfolio performance. To enable this analysis, we build on 
Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), who show a relation between the return on the BAB factor and 
funding constraint tightness. In particular, they show a negative relation between the BAB factor 
return and the lagged level of the TED spread, which is the difference between the three-month 
LIBOR and the three-month U.S. Treasuries bill rate.38,39 Following the logic of Ferson and Schadt 
(1996), we use that relation to generate a model that (i) identifies timing that can be attributed to 
the public information about future BAB factor returns embedded in the lagged TED spread and 
(ii) does not treat BAB factor timing attributable to that information as alpha. 
 
38 Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) also consider the relation between the contemporaneous TED spread and the return 
on the BAB factor, but that relation is not investable, so we do not consider it. 
39 In our sample period, we also find a negative relation between the lagged level of the TED spread and the BAB 
factor return: the average BAB factor return is 0.20% per month when the lagged TED spread is equal to or above its 
median level, compared to 0.72% per month when its below median. 
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We begin our analysis by dividing our time period of study into two states—‘High TED’ 
and ‘Low TED’—depending on whether the one-month lagged level of the TED spread is above 
or below its sample median.40 We then evaluate the BAB exposures of the ‘Top BAB’ and ‘Btm 
BAB’ portfolios in each of the states using the FH8+BAB model and both LASSO regressions and 
OLS regressions. For a given portfolio, if the BAB exposure is greater in the ‘Low TED’ state 
compared to the ‘High TED’ state, that suggests that the hedge funds in the portfolio are timing 
the BAB factor using public information. If public-information-based timing is occurring, our split 
design will not treat the elevated BAB exposure in the ‘Low TED’ state as alpha. 
Table 1.10 reports the results for the ‘Top BAB’ and ‘Btm BAB’ portfolios. The pattern of 
the BAB exposures for the ‘Top BAB’ portfolio is consistent with the hedge funds in that portfolio 
timing the BAB factor based on public information. Using the LASSO regressions, the ‘Top BAB’ 
portfolio has a BAB exposure of 1.41 (t-stat = 8.66) in the ‘Low TED’ state, but an exposure of 
only 0.57 (t-stat = 4.64) in the ‘High TED’ state. The statistical significance of the difference 
between those two BAB exposures cannot be assessed because the factors selected by the LASSO 
regressions change between time periods, so we turn to the OLS regressions for further analysis. 
Using the OLS regressions, the difference in BAB exposures between the two states is both 
economically and statistically significant at 0.72 (t-stat = 3.22). Conversely, for the ‘Btm BAB’ 
portfolio, there is some evidence of timing based on public information—the LASSO regressions 
select the BAB factor as relevant in the ‘Low TED’ state, but not the ‘High TED’ state—but using 
the OLS regressions, the difference in BAB exposures between the two states is not near 
statistically significant at any conventional level (t-stat = 0.93). 
 




Comparing the ‘Top BAB’ and ‘Btm BAB’ portfolios in each state, the ‘Btm BAB’ 
portfolio performs better regardless of the level of the lagged TED spread. When public-
information-based BAB factor timing is not treated as alpha, untabulated OLS regressions show 
that the ‘Btm BAB’ portfolio outperforms the ‘Top BAB’ portfolio by 0.55% per month (t-stat = 
1.90) in the ‘High TED’ state and 0.64% per month (t-stat = 2.37) in the ‘Low TED’ state. 
Although, we should consider that result cautiously for three reasons. First, we did not control for 
any other public information that could help predict the return on the BAB factor or other factors 
in the model.41 Second, we did not adapt the model to try to capture as alpha any timing related to 
nonpublic information. Third, the point in time when it is reasonable to consider the relation 
between the lagged TED spread and the BAB factor return to be public is unclear. Before the 
relation was public, the argument that taking advantage of the relation should not be considered 
alpha is weaker. 
Nonetheless, those caveats do not meaningfully affect our conclusion that using substantial 
amounts of BAB exposure is a signal of relatively low manager skill. The model in this subsection 
is, perhaps, biased against the ‘Top BAB’ portfolio; however, the model in the prior subsection 
(8.1) is biased towards the ‘Top BAB’ portfolio and still finds the ‘Btm BAB’ portfolio performs 
better. The difference in performance between the two portfolios holds even if we switch to 
performance measures that embrace the idea that investors do not draw a strong distinction 
between returns from active management and returns from factor exposures (Agarwal, Green, and 
Ren, 2018). In fact, the difference in performance between the ‘Top BAB’ portfolio and the ‘Btm 
BAB’ portfolio holds even if all returns are treated equally. The ‘Top BAB’ portfolio has an 
 
41 Boguth and Simutin (2018) show that BAB factor returns can be predicted by variation in leverage constraint 
tightness indicated by changes in the average beta of the stocks held by mutual funds, which the findings of Shive and 
Yun (2013) suggest could be accounted for by hedge funds. Furthermore, Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Hong and 
Sraer (2016) suggest that measures of investor sentiment and investor disagreement could predict BAB factor returns. 
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average excess return of 4.3% per year with a Sharpe ratio of 0.45, while the ‘Btm BAB’ portfolio 
has an average excess return of 6.3% per year with a Sharpe ratio of 0.64. The differences in those 
measures once again support the idea that relatively low skill hedge fund managers are the most 
reliant on BAB exposure. 
1.9. Conclusion 
Past research has focused on the relation between the low beta anomaly and mutual funds. 
The conditions of the mutual fund industry cause most mutual funds to not capitalize on the 
anomaly. However, operating under a different set of conditions, hedge funds are well positioned 
to capitalize. In this paper, we provide the first extensive empirical evidence showing that hedge 
funds do tend to “bet against beta.” We further show that the performance of the average hedge 
fund is significantly overstated by not accounting for that tendency and that the tendency is 







Table 1.1: The performance of an equal weight portfolio of all hedge funds 
This table shows the net-of-fee performance of an equal weight portfolio of all hedge funds from January 1996 through March 2012. 
The portfolio is evaluated using both the FH8 model and the FH8+BAB model. Columns (1) and (2) report results from the LASSO 
regressions, and columns (4) and (5) report results from the OLS regressions. Column (3) tests the differences between columns (1) and 
(2), while column (6) tests the differences between columns (4) and (5). A “.” in the table means that the corresponding factor is not 
selected by the LASSO regression. t-statistics are in brackets below each coefficient. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  FH8 FH8+BAB   
(2) − (1) 
  FH8 FH8+BAB   
(5) − (4) 
 LASSO  LASSO    OLS  OLS   
 (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
SP500 0.10*** 0.17***  0.07**  0.10*** 0.17***  0.07** 
 [3.71] [6.17]  [2.46]  [3.72] [6.23]  [2.51] 
SizeSpread 0.10*** 0.11***  0.01  0.10*** 0.11***  0.01 
 [4.24] [5.05]  [0.43]  [4.26] [5.11]  [0.46] 
EmergMkt 0.18*** 0.16***  -0.02  0.18*** 0.16***  -0.02 
 [9.40] [9.00]  [-1.10]  [9.40] [9.04]  [-1.10] 
10Year 0.20*** 0.15***  -0.04  0.19*** 0.14***  -0.05 
 [4.52] [3.77]  [-1.09]  [4.30] [3.44]  [-1.18] 
CreditSpread 0.17*** 0.12***  -0.05  0.17*** 0.12***  -0.05 
 [3.83] [2.81]  [-1.28]  [3.88] [2.92]  [-1.24] 
BondTrend . .    0.00 0.01  0.00 
      [0.69] [1.28]  [0.53] 
FxTrend 0.01** 0.01**  -0.00  0.01** 0.01**  -0.00 
 [2.55] [2.42]  [-0.36]  [2.43] [2.22]  [-0.43] 
ComTrend 0.01** 0.01**  -0.00  0.01** 0.01**  -0.00 
 [2.31] [2.13]  [-0.39]  [2.23] [1.99]  [-0.44] 
BAB  0.40***  0.40***   0.40***  0.40*** 
  [6.10]  [6.10]   [6.19]  [6.19] 
Alpha 0.30*** 0.12  -0.19**  0.31*** 0.13  -0.19** 
 [3.71] [1.43]  [-2.32]  [3.76] [1.57]  [-2.27] 
Observations 195 195  195  195 195  195 







Table 1.2: The performance of an equal weight portfolio of all ‘traditional’ mutual funds 
This table shows the net-of-fee performance of an equal weight portfolio of all ‘traditional’ mutual funds from January 1996 through 
March 2012. The portfolio is evaluated using both the FH8 model and the FH8+BAB model. Columns (1) and (2) report results from 
the LASSO regressions, and columns (3) and (4) report results from the OLS regressions. Column (5) tests the differences between 
columns (3) and (4). A “.” in the table means that the corresponding factor is not selected by the LASSO regression. t-statistics are in 
brackets below each coefficient. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  FH8 FH8+BAB  FH8 FH8+BAB  (4) − (3) 
 LASSO LASSO  OLS OLS  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) 
SP500 0.49*** 0.49***  0.49*** 0.50***  0.01 
 [37.35] [37.35]  [37.16] [35.25]  [0.91] 
SizeSpread 0.20*** 0.20***  0.20*** 0.20***  0.00 
 [17.22] [17.22]  [17.10] [17.41]  [0.17] 
EmergMkt 0.08*** 0.08***  0.08*** 0.08***  -0.00 
 [9.14] [9.14]  [9.11] [8.66]  [-0.40] 
10Year 0.18*** 0.18***  0.18*** 0.17***  -0.01 
 [8.80] [8.80]  [8.42] [7.92]  [-0.43] 
CreditSpread 0.16*** 0.16***  0.17*** 0.16***  -0.01 
 [8.01] [8.01]  [7.97] [7.44]  [-0.45] 
BondTrend . .  0.00 0.00  0.00 
    [0.81] [1.00]  [0.19] 
FxTrend . .  0.00 0.00  -0.00 
    [0.57] [0.42]  [-0.16] 
ComTrend . .  -0.00 -0.00  -0.00 
    [-0.15] [-0.31]  [-0.16] 
BAB  .   0.08**  0.08** 
     [2.25]  [2.25] 
Alpha -0.04 -0.04  -0.04 -0.07*  -0.03 
 [-1.09] [-1.09]  [-0.93] [-1.70]  [-0.83] 
Observations 195 195  195 195  195 







Table 1.3: The performance of an equal weight portfolio of all ‘alternative’ mutual funds 
This table shows the net-of-fee performance of an equal weight portfolio of all ‘alternative’ mutual funds from January 1996 through 
March 2012. The portfolio is evaluated using both the FH8 model and the FH8+BAB model. Columns (1) and (2) report results from 
the LASSO regressions, and columns (4) and (5) report results from the OLS regressions. Column (3) tests the differences between 
columns (1) and (2), while column (6) tests the differences between columns (4) and (5). A “.” in the table means that the corresponding 
factor is not selected by the LASSO regression. t-statistics are in brackets below each coefficient. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 FH8 FH8+BAB   (2) − (1) 
  FH8 FH8+BAB   
(5) − (4) 
 LASSO LASSO 
  OLS OLS  
 (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
SP500 0.29*** 0.34***  0.04***  0.29*** 0.34***  0.04*** 
 [19.50] [23.11]  [2.97]  [19.69] [23.10]  [2.87] 
SizeSpread 0.12*** 0.13***  0.01  0.12*** 0.12***  0.01 
 [9.15] [10.82]  [0.49]  [9.08] [10.69]  [0.52] 
EmergMkt 0.08*** 0.07***  -0.01  0.08*** 0.07***  -0.01 
 [8.11] [7.70]  [-1.32]  [8.09] [7.68]  [-1.26] 
10Year 0.15*** 0.12***  -0.03  0.15*** 0.12***  -0.03 
 [6.45] [5.85]  [-1.33]  [6.46] [5.78]  [-1.35] 
CreditSpread 0.11*** 0.08***  -0.03  0.11*** 0.08***  -0.03 
 [4.56] [3.64]  [-1.42]  [4.79] [3.85]  [-1.42] 
BondTrend . .    -0.00 -0.00  0.00 
      [-0.91] [-0.42]  [0.61] 
FxTrend . .    0.01* 0.00*  -0.00 
      [1.97] [1.72]  [-0.50] 
ComTrend . .    0.00 -0.00  -0.00 
      [0.42] [-0.03]  [-0.51] 
BAB  0.25***  0.25***   0.24***  0.24*** 
  [7.31]  [7.31]   [7.07]  [7.07] 
Alpha -0.08* -0.20***  -0.12***  -0.09* -0.19***  -0.11** 
 [-1.81] [-4.66]  [-2.76]  [-1.92] [-4.60]  [-2.59] 
          
Observations 195 195  195  195 195  195 







Table 1.4: The performance of the top and bottom alpha decile portfolios 
This table shows the net-of-fee performance of monthly rebalanced portfolios of hedge funds formed based on past fund alpha. At the 
beginning of each month, we run separate LASSO regressions on the past 24 monthly excess returns of each fund using the FH8+BAB 
model. We then sort the funds into deciles based on their alphas. The ‘Top α’ portfolio is an equal weight portfolio of all the funds in 
the highest alpha decile. The ‘Btm α’ portfolio is an equal weight portfolio of all the funds in the lowest alpha decile. The period of 
evaluation for the portfolios is January 1998 through March 2012. The portfolios are evaluated using both the FH8 model and the 
FH8+BAB model. Columns (1) through (4) report results from using LASSO regressions to evaluate portfolio performance. Columns 
(5), (6), (8), and (9) report results from using OLS regressions to evaluate portfolio performance. Column (7) tests the differences 
between columns (5) and (6), and column (10) tests the differences between columns (8) and (9). A “.” in the table means that the 
corresponding factor is not selected by the LASSO regression. t-statistics are in brackets below each coefficient. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Top α portfolio   Btm α portfolio   Top α portfolio   Btm α portfolio   
 FH8 FH8+BAB  FH8 FH8+BAB  FH8 FH8+BAB (6) − (5) 
FH8 FH8+BAB 
(9) − (8) 
 LASSO  LASSO   LASSO  LASSO   OLS OLS OLS OLS 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
SP500 . .  0.08 0.21***  0.01 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.22*** 0.13** 
    [1.28] [3.48]  [0.20] [0.79] [0.61] [1.48] [3.56] [2.10] 
SizeSpread 0.37*** 0.37***  . .  0.38*** 0.39*** 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.03 
 [6.49] [6.49]     [6.38] [6.54] [0.17] [-0.15] [0.43] [0.59] 
EmergMkt 0.26*** 0.26***  0.28*** 0.25***  0.26*** 0.25*** -0.01 0.28*** 0.24*** -0.04 
 [9.57] [9.57]  [7.20] [6.76]  [5.79] [5.43] [-0.28] [6.86] [6.30] [-0.97] 
10Year . .  0.28*** .  0.10 0.06 -0.04 0.28*** 0.17* -0.10 
    [3.05]   [0.94] [0.58] [-0.34] [2.97] [1.97] [-1.16] 
CreditSpread . .  0.31*** 0.15*  0.05 0.01 -0.03 0.36*** 0.26*** -0.10 
    [3.54] [1.93]  [0.45] [0.11] [-0.33] [3.90] [2.98] [-1.13] 
BondTrend . .  . .  0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
       [1.24] [1.39] [0.15] [0.41] [0.97] [0.53] 
FxTrend . .  . .  0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 
       [0.25] [0.16] [-0.09] [0.95] [0.71] [-0.31] 
ComTrend 0.03** 0.03**  . .  0.03** 0.03* -0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.01 
 [2.47] [2.47]     [2.02] [1.89] [-0.13] [1.48] [1.14] [-0.45] 
BAB  .   0.80***   0.25 0.25  0.73*** 0.73*** 
     [5.89]   [1.52] [1.52]  [5.26] [5.26] 
Alpha 0.74*** 0.74***  0.02 -0.27  0.74*** 0.63*** -0.11 0.05 -0.26 -0.31* 
 [3.84] [3.84]  [0.11] [-1.53]  [3.70] [3.01] [-0.50] [0.27] [-1.46] [-1.73] 
Observations 171 171  171 171  171 171 171 171 171 171 




Table 1.5: The characteristics of the top and bottom BAB hedge funds 
This table shows mean characteristics for hedge funds in the top and bottom deciles of past BAB 
exposure t-statistic. The BAB exposure t-statistic is estimated for each fund using an OLS 
regression, the past 24 months of excess returns, and the FH8+BAB model. The differences in the 
mean characteristics and the t-statistics associated with those differences are also reported. The 
t-statistics are calculated using standard errors clustered on fund and year-month. We trim the top 
and bottom 1% of all continuous variables. The variables listed after “Redemption Notice” are all 
indicators, with all the previous variables being continuous. “Directional Traders”, “Relative 
Value”, “Security Selection”, and “Multiprocess” are broad style categories identified following 
Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009). 
  Top BAB Funds Btm BAB Funds Difference Diff t-stat 
Assets ($M) 161.17 139.48 21.69 0.85 
Age (months) 84.73 80.69 4.03 1.78 
Min Invest ($M) 0.53 0.76 -0.23 -1.47 
Mgmt Fee (%) 1.47 1.58 -0.11 -2.91 
Incentive Fee (%) 19.23 19.96 -0.73 -4.02 
Hurdle Rate (%) 5.57 6.12 -0.55 -0.71 
Lockup Period (days) 304.81 355.32 -50.51 -1.37 
Redemption Notice (days) 41.60 35.03 6.57 1.28 
High Water Mark 0.79 0.87 -0.08 -2.54 
Offshore (non-US) 0.84 0.64 0.20 4.84 
Directional Traders 0.18 0.28 -0.09 -3.14 
Relative Value 0.22 0.16 0.06 1.93 
Security Selection 0.35 0.37 -0.02 -0.61 




Table 1.6: The performance of the BAB portfolios using LASSO 
This table shows the net-of-fee performance of monthly rebalanced portfolios of hedge funds 
formed based on past BAB exposure t-statistic. At the beginning of each month, we run separate 
OLS regressions on the past 24 monthly excess returns of each fund using the FH8+BAB model. 
We then sort the funds into deciles based on their BAB exposure t-statistics. The ‘Top BAB’ 
portfolio is an equal weight portfolio of all the funds in the highest BAB decile. The ‘Btm BAB’ 
portfolio is an equal weight portfolio of all the funds in the lowest BAB decile. The period of 
evaluation for the portfolios is January 1998 through March 2012. The portfolios are evaluated 
using LASSO regressions and both the FH8 model and the FH8+BAB model. A “.” in the table 
means that the corresponding factor is not selected by the LASSO regression. t-statistics are in 
brackets below each coefficient. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
  Top BAB portfolio   Btm BAB portfolio   Btm − Top 
 FH8 FH8+BAB  FH8 FH8+BAB  FH8 FH8+BAB 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
SP500 . 0.17***  . .  . . 
  [4.01]       
SizeSpread . .  0.33*** 0.33***  0.33*** 0.33*** 
    [8.26] [8.26]  [6.78] [7.02] 
EmergMkt 0.22*** 0.17***  0.21*** 0.21***  . . 
 [9.45] [6.53]  [10.87] [10.87]    
10Year 0.33*** 0.22***  . .  -0.21** . 
 [4.61] [3.65]     [-2.40]  
CreditSpread 0.30*** 0.19***  . .  -0.23*** -0.17*** 
 [4.34] [3.12]     [-3.30] [-2.86] 
BondTrend . .  . .  . . 
         
FxTrend . .  . .  . . 
         
ComTrend . .  . .  . . 
         
BAB  0.83***   .   -0.62*** 
  [8.61]      [-5.07] 
Alpha 0.07 -0.29**  0.29** 0.29**  0.17 0.39** 
 [0.50] [-2.31]  [2.09] [2.09]  [1.00] [2.29] 
Observations 171 171  171 171  171 171 







Table 1.7: The performance of the BAB portfolios using OLS  
This table shows the net-of-fee performance of the BAB portfolios defined in Table 1.6 estimated using OLS regressions. The period of 
evaluation for the portfolios is January 1998 through March 2012. The portfolios are evaluated using both the FH8 model and the 
FH8+BAB model. t-statistics are in brackets below each coefficient. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
  Top BAB portfolio   Btm BAB portfolio   Btm − Top   
 FH8 FH8+BAB (2) − (1) FH8 FH8+BAB (5) − (4) FH8 FH8+BAB (8) − (7) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
SP500 0.03 0.18*** 0.15*** 0.10** 0.13** 0.03 0.06 -0.05 -0.12* 
 [0.71] [4.10] [3.32] [2.04] [2.49] [0.61] [1.05] [-0.83] [-1.85] 
SizeSpread -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.01 0.36*** 0.33*** -0.03 
 [-0.26] [0.62] [0.93] [8.38] [8.54] [0.17] [6.85] [6.71] [-0.52] 
EmergMkt 0.20*** 0.16*** -0.04 0.15*** 0.14*** -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.03 
 [6.34] [5.89] [-1.54] [4.82] [4.48] [-0.28] [-1.25] [-0.44] [0.86] 
10Year 0.35*** 0.24*** -0.12* 0.13* 0.10 -0.02 -0.23** -0.14 0.09 
 [4.82] [3.76] [-1.84] [1.73] [1.36] [-0.34] [-2.48] [-1.54] [1.03] 
CreditSpread 0.31*** 0.20*** -0.11* 0.10 0.07 -0.02 -0.21** -0.13 0.09 
 [4.28] [3.20] [-1.79] [1.35] [0.99] [-0.33] [-2.36] [-1.45] [1.00] 
BondTrend -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
 [-1.30] [-0.70] [0.84] [0.10] [0.25] [0.15] [1.11] [0.71] [-0.47] 
FxTrend 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 [1.45] [1.23] [-0.49] [1.34] [1.25] [-0.09] [-0.10] [0.17] [0.27] 
ComTrend 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 
 [1.08] [0.57] [-0.71] [0.35] [0.22] [-0.13] [-0.59] [-0.22] [0.40] 
BAB  0.82*** 0.82***  0.18 0.18  -0.64*** -0.64*** 
  [8.32] [8.32]  [1.52] [1.52]  [-4.64] [-4.64] 
Alpha 0.05 -0.29** -0.34*** 0.27* 0.20 -0.07 0.22 0.49*** 0.27 
 [0.38] [-2.31] [-2.74] [1.95] [1.34] [-0.50] [1.24] [2.77] [1.53] 
Observations 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 







Table 1.8: The performance of the BAB portfolios using LASSO after accounting for market timing  
This table shows the net-of-fee performance of the BAB portfolios defined in Table 1.6 using LASSO regressions after accounting for 
market timing. The period of evaluation for the portfolios is January 1998 through March 2012. The portfolios are evaluated using the 
FH8+BAB model with timing factors. The first column for each portfolio reports the base factor exposures, and the second column 
reports the exposures to the Henriksson and Merton (1981) style timing factors. The bottom rows of the table report the components of 
each portfolio’s active return (FH8 Timing Return, BAB Timing Return, and Non-Timing Alpha) and the Total Active Return, which 
is the sum of the components. A “.” in the table means that the corresponding factor is not selected by the LASSO regression. t-statistics 
are in brackets below each coefficient. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 














  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
SP500 0.19*** .   . .   . . 
  [4.36]          
SizeSpread . .   0.15** 0.33***   0.15* 0.27** 
      [2.12] [2.99]   [1.75] [2.00] 
EmergMkt 0.17*** .   0.21*** .   . . 
  [6.55]    [11.32]      
10Year 0.21*** .   . .   . . 
  [3.39]          
CreditSpread 0.17*** .   . .   . . 
  [2.80]          
BondTrend . .   . .   . . 
            
FxTrend . .   . .   . . 
            
ComTrend . .   . .   . . 
            
BAB 0.44** 0.69**   . .   -0.58*** . 
  [2.44] [2.51]       [-4.75]  
Observations 171   171   171 
Adjusted R2 0.71   0.63   0.29 
FH8 Timing Return 0.00   0.46   0.38 
BAB Timing Return 0.53   0.00   0.00 
Non-Timing Alpha -0.64   -0.14   0.04 
Total Active Return -0.10   0.32**   0.41** 







Table 1.9: The performance of the BAB portfolios using OLS after accounting for market timing 
This table shows the net-of-fee performance of the BAB portfolios defined in Table 1.6 using OLS regressions after accounting for 
market timing. The period of evaluation for the portfolios is January 1998 through March 2012. The portfolios are evaluated using the 
FH8+BAB model with timing factors. The first column for each portfolio reports the base factor exposures, and the second column 
reports the exposures to the Henriksson and Merton (1981) style timing factors. The bottom rows of the table report the components of 
each portfolio’s active return (FH8 Timing Return, BAB Timing Return, and Non-Timing Alpha) and the Total Active Return, which 
is the sum of the components. t-statistics are in brackets below each coefficient. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 














  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
SP500 0.11 0.12   0.10 0.04   -0.01 -0.08 
  [1.59] [1.16]   [1.20] [0.31]   [-0.08] [-0.53] 
SizeSpread -0.05 0.12   0.16** 0.35***   0.20** 0.23* 
  [-0.72] [1.21]   [2.04] [2.99]   [2.21] [1.67] 
EmergMkt 0.10** 0.13*   0.15*** -0.00   0.06 -0.13 
  [2.10] [1.88]   [2.79] [-0.03]   [0.89] [-1.32] 
10Year 0.36*** -0.23   0.24 -0.27   -0.12 -0.05 
  [3.03] [-1.13]   [1.65] [-1.12]   [-0.71] [-0.16] 
CreditSpread 0.41*** -0.36**   0.01 0.16   -0.40*** 0.52** 
  [3.95] [-2.39]   [0.12] [0.89]   [-2.62] [2.39] 
BondTrend -0.01 0.02   0.01 -0.01   0.03 -0.04 
  [-0.79] [0.92]   [0.54] [-0.41]   [1.00] [-0.98] 
FxTrend 0.04** -0.05**   0.02 -0.01   -0.02 0.04 
  [2.13] [-2.10]   [0.76] [-0.31]   [-0.83] [1.19] 
ComTrend 0.01 -0.01   0.02 -0.03   0.02 -0.02 
  [0.35] [-0.43]   [0.91] [-0.91]   [0.52] [-0.47] 
BAB 0.37* 0.74**   0.15 0.09   -0.22 -0.65 
  [1.68] [2.38]   [0.55] [0.25]   [-0.69] [-1.43] 
Observations 171   171   171 
Adjusted R2 0.73   0.63   0.33 
FH8 Timing Return 0.01   0.16   0.15 
BAB Timing Return 0.58   0.07   -0.50 
Non-Timing Alpha -0.63   0.01   0.64 
Total Active Return -0.04   0.24   0.28 







Table 1.10: The TED spread and the BAB exposures of the BAB portfolios 
This table shows the net-of-fee performance of the BAB portfolios defined in Table 1.6 conditional on the lagged level of the TED 
spread. The TED spread is the difference between the three-month LIBOR and the three-month U.S. Treasury bill rate. The period of 
evaluation for the portfolios is January 1998 through March 2012. Columns (1), (3), (5), and (8), which are labeled ‘High TED’, report 
the results for months in which the lagged by one month TED spread is higher than or equal to the sample median. Columns (2), (4), 
(6), and (9), which are labeled ‘Low TED’, report the results for the other months. The portfolios are evaluated using the FH8+BAB 
model. Columns (1) through (4) report results from using LASSO regressions to evaluate portfolio performance. Columns (5), (6), (8), 
and (9) report results from using OLS regressions to evaluate portfolio performance. Column (7) tests the differences between columns 
(5) and (6), and column (10) tests the differences between columns (8) and (9). A “.” in the table means that the corresponding factor is 
not selected by the LASSO regression. t-statistics are in brackets below each coefficient. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Top BAB portfolio   Btm BAB portfolio  Top BAB portfolio   Btm BAB portfolio  
 High TED Low TED  High TED Low TED  High TED Low TED (5) − (6) 
High TED Low TED 
(8) − (9) 
 LASSO LASSO  LASSO LASSO  OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
SP500 0.14*** 0.28***  . 0.16**  0.15*** 0.30*** -0.15 0.15* 0.15** 0.00 
  [2.75] [3.96]   [2.57]  [2.73] [3.65] [-1.47] [1.94] [2.43] [0.01] 
SizeSpread . .  0.41*** 0.20***  0.02 0.07 -0.06 0.46*** 0.20*** 0.26*** 
     [7.10] [4.05]  [0.35] [1.10] [-0.71] [7.35] [4.01] [2.81] 
EmergMkt 0.18*** 0.15***  0.21*** 0.13***  0.17*** 0.12** 0.05 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.02 
  [5.74] [3.09]  [7.83] [3.17]  [5.16] [2.18] [0.83] [3.27] [3.15] [0.33] 
10Year 0.21** .  . 0.20***  0.22** 0.22** 0.00 -0.08 0.21*** -0.29* 
  [2.43]    [3.13]  [2.40] [2.54] [0.01] [-0.64] [3.10] [-1.95] 
CreditSpread 0.24*** .  . 0.20**  0.25*** 0.12 0.12 -0.01 0.20** -0.21 
  [3.21]    [2.54]  [3.12] [1.14] [0.93] [-0.11] [2.46] [-1.35] 
BondTrend . .  . 0.01  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.02 
      [1.46]  [-0.25] [-0.02] [-0.16] [1.22] [-0.22] [1.14] 
FxTrend . .  . .  0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 
        [0.77] [0.10] [0.47] [0.65] [1.35] [-0.06] 
ComTrend . .  . .  -0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 
        [-0.26] [1.24] [-1.06] [-0.16] [0.32] [-0.29] 
BAB 0.57*** 1.41***  . 0.37***  0.59*** 1.30*** -0.72*** 0.12 0.36*** -0.24 
 [4.64] [8.66]   [2.90]  [4.58] [7.32] [-3.22] [0.65] [2.65] [-0.93] 
Alpha -0.18 -0.66***  0.34 -0.06  -0.19 -0.70*** 0.51* 0.36 -0.06 0.42 
 [-1.11] [-3.20]  [1.48] [-0.40]  [-1.12] [-3.26] [1.86] [1.54] [-0.37] [1.32] 
Observations 87 84  87 84  87 84  87 84  





Figure 1.1: The frequency of the BAB and FH8 factors being selected by LASSO regressions 
This figure shows how often each factor in Eq. (1.2) is selected across 6,163 fund-level LASSO 
(least absolute shrinkage and selection operator) regressions. We require each hedge fund to have 
at least 24 monthly observations and run LASSO regressions on the monthly excess net returns of 
each hedge fund using the FH8 (Fung and Hsieh eight) factors and the BAB (betting-against-beta) 
factor. The full sample period is January 1996 through March 2012, but the period for each 


































Figure 1.2: The distribution of hedge funds’ BAB exposures 
This figure shows the distribution of BAB (betting-against-beta) exposures resulting from 6,163 
fund-level OLS regressions of monthly excess net fund returns on the FH8 (Fung and Hsieh eight) 
and BAB factors. We require each hedge fund to have at least 24 observations and trim the top 1% 
and bottom 1% of BAB exposures. The full sample period is January 1996 through March 2012, 































































































































































































Figure 1.3: The statistical significance of hedge funds’ BAB exposures 
This figure shows the distribution of BAB (betting-against-beta) exposures by sign and statistical 
significance at the 10% level. The percentages reported are derived from 6,163 fund-level OLS 
regressions of monthly excess net fund returns on the FH8 (Fung and Hsieh eight) and BAB factors. 
We require each hedge fund to have at least 24 observations. The full sample period is January 







Significant negative BAB exposure
Insignificant negative BAB exposure
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Chapter 2. Hedge Fund Performance Prediction with Machine Learning 
Alexey Malakhov, Timothy B. Riley, Qing Yan 
2.1. Introduction 
The popular press and academic research both indicate that, over the past decade, the 
performance of the hedge fund industry has declined.42 Despite that trend, hedge funds are still an 
important component of the financial market with more than $5 trillion in assets under 
management.43 Given their prominence, there are significant gains to being able to identify the 
hedge funds that can be expected to outperform. Many hedge fund performance predictors have 
been proposed in literature; however, substantial uncertainty remains. Do the predictors still have 
power? Which predictors are most important? Can the predictors be effectively used in 
combination? In the absence of a framework to analyze these questions, the literature has been 
focused on either individual novel predictors or ad hoc combinations of predictors.44 
In this study, we use multiple machine learning models to dynamically identify and 
combine 22 previously documented predictors of hedge fund performance. We find that these 
models are able to identify outperforming hedge funds in both the full sample and key subperiods. 
We train two linear models (OLS and LASSO) and three tree-based nonlinear models 
(bagged regression trees, random forest, and boosted regression trees) to learn the relation between 
those 22 predictors and two-year-ahead alpha. We then apply the fitted models out-of-sample and 
evaluate their predictive power. The models are re-fitted and predictions are made from 2002 to 
 
42 See, for example, “A losing bet: Hedge funds haven’t delivered on their promise,” The Economist, May 7 th, 2016 
and Bollen, Joenväärä, and Kauppila (2020). 
43 Using the most comprehensive data available, Barth, Joenväärä, Kauppila, and Wermers (2019) show that the net 
assets under management for hedge fund industry were, in 2016, more than $5.2 trillion. 
44 See, for example, Fung and Hsieh (1997, 2001, 2004); Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007); Bali, Gokcan, and Liang 
(2007); Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009); Patton (2009); Sadka (2010); Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov (2010); 
Titman and Tiu (2011); Sun, Wang, and Zheng (2011); Cao, Chen, Liang, and Lo (2013); Bali, Brown, and Caglayan 




2017. Over that period, a one-dollar investment in an equal weight, annually rebalancing portfolio 
of the hedge funds with the highest predicted alphas from the linear models returns $7.03. Using 
the non-linear models, the return is $5.21. In comparison, an equal weight portfolio of all hedge 
funds returns just $2.50, and an investment in the S&P 500 returns just $3.22. 
The portfolio of hedge funds with the highest predicted alphas from each of the five 
machine learning models delivers economically large and statistically significant out-of-sample 
alpha. The alphas range from 5.16% per year (t-stat = 2.24) to 7.80% per year (t-stat = 3.52). 
During the 2008 to 2017 subperiod—during which Bollen, Joenväärä, and Kauppila (2020) find 
allocations to hedge funds do not improve risk-adjusted performance—the portfolios formed based 
on the machine learning models still deliver superior performance. For example, the portfolio 
generated by the LASSO model during that period has an alpha of 8.88% per year (t-stat = 2.91), 
an annual return of 11.64%, and a Sharpe ratio of 0.80. The S&P 500 over the same time period 
had a 9% annual return and a Sharpe ratio of 0.59 (and, by construction, an alpha of zero). 
Our models are designed to allow the importance of each predictor to vary over time. 
However, we find that average return and alpha; Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2012) systematic 
risk; Duanmu, Malakhov, and McCumber (2018) beta activity; and Bali, Brown, and Caglayan 
(2019) maximum return are consistently important. The alpha t-statistic, the Sharpe ratio, and 
Titman and Tiu (2011) R2 are, on average, less important. 
To compare with the traditional approach, we also form portfolios based on the individual 
predictors. None of the resulting 22 portfolios has a greater alpha than the LASSO-based machine 
learning portfolio. Further, the average alpha of the portfolios based on the individual predictors 
is 3.72% per year, which is 28% lower than the average across the machine learning portfolios 




being predicted (e.g., using past Sharpe ratio to predict future Sharpe ratio), whereas the machine 
learning portfolios perform well across all common metrics. 
The machine learning models provide information about future hedge fund performance 
that is not captured by the individual predictors. We isolate a given machine learning model’s 
unique information by excluding from that model’s portfolio any hedge funds that both the 
machine learning model and an individual predictor identify as expected future outperformers. 
After this exclusion, the machine learning portfolios all retain their superior out-of-sample 
performance. Conversely, if the same method is applied to isolate the individual predictors’ unique 
information, the individual predictor portfolios tend to perform significantly worse. Hence, only 
the machine learning models generate unique information of value to investors.  
There is a substantial literature on hedge fund performance prediction, but the prior work 
tends to focus on individual predictors. The study most closely related to ours is Bollen, Joenväärä, 
and Kauppila (2020), which also considers a set of predictors. They consider 26 predictors and use 
hedge funds’ ranks with respect to those predictors to perform sorts—implicitly assuming time 
invariant, equal predictive power for each measure. Our machine learning models, on the other 
hand, allow predictive power to vary in both the time-series and cross-section. This allowance is 
important as investor learning (McLean and Pontiff, 2016) and changing market conditions 
(Kacperczyk, van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2014) should, in expectation, cause a given 
predictor’s power to be nonconstant. The relaxation of assumptions about predictive power that 
machine learning permits could explain the markedly different results between our study and 
Bollen, Joenväärä, and Kauppila (2020) with respect to hedge fund performance from 2008 onward. 
The contention of Harvey, Liu, and Zhu (2016, pg. 5) that “most claimed research findings 




literature, with the asset management space being no exception (e.g., Riley, 2019, and Jones and 
Mo, 2019). We do not directly replicate any prior results—either in- or out-of-sample—and our 
analysis is not immune from bias, but our analysis does provide a framework for the parsimonious 
simultaneous re-evaluation of a set of predictors. With our framework, it is possible to efficiently 
separate the predictors that do have unique predictive power from those predictors that do not, 
while also capturing information about when a given predictor has been useful. 
Despite its wide application in general, machine learning is sparsely applied in financial 
research. Khandani, Kim and Lo (2010) use machine learning models to forecast credit card 
delinquencies and defaults; Rapach, Strauss, and Zhou (2013) and Gu, Kelly, and Xiu (2020) use 
machine learning models to predict stock returns; and Culkin and Das (2017) use machine learning 
models to predict option prices. Our study, being the first to use machine learning models to predict 
hedge fund performance, contributes a novel and economically important machine learning 
application to this growing literature. 
2.2. Data and methods 
2.2.1. Hedge fund data 
We collect the hedge fund data from Bloomberg database over the period January 1994 –
December 2018. The data includes monthly net returns and common fund characteristics, such as 
assets under management, fees, and style.45 We start with 20,072 unique funds, including both live 
and defunct funds. Like other databases, hedge funds report data to Bloomberg on a voluntary 
basis, although Bloomberg requires that all reporting funds provide performance since inception. 
To reduce backfill bias, we drop the first 24 months of each fund’s returns, which remains 13,883 
 




funds.46 For training dataset, we require four years return history to calculate all the predictors and 
two-year-ahead returns to calculate FH8 alpha. For out-of-sample testing dataset, we require four 
years return history to have all the predictors available.  This leads to a final sample of 3,820 funds 
in the training dataset and 5,137 funds in the testing dataset.  
Panel A of Table 2.1 provides summary statistics of all 20,072 hedge funds on fund returns, 
assets, fees, and fund longevity. Since medians are less affected by outliers and thus more 
representative, we focus on the medians. The representative fund has a 0.39% average excess 
monthly return, $45.4 million under management, a 1.5% management fee, and a 20% 
performance fee. 
Panel B of Table 2.1 reports the number of unique funds and the average return of an equal 
weight portfolio of all hedge funds by year. The highest average monthly return of 2.08% (24.96% 
per year) in 1999 is consistent with the results in Joenväärä, Kauppila, Kosowski, and Tolonen 
(2019). The lowest average monthly return of –1.61% (–19.32% per year), and highest monthly 
volatility of 3.59% (12.44% per year) both occur in the 2008 financial crisis. 
2.2.2. Fund performance measure and predictors 
In this study, we train five machine learning models to predict two-year-ahead Fung and 
Hsieh (2004) eight-factor model alpha (FH8 thereafter) with 22 predictors.47 Although there are 
studies suggest certain fund characteristics are associated with fund performance, those 
characteristics seldom change over time.48 Given the dynamic feature of hedge funds, we use 
return based variables instead of fund characteristics as predictors. We consider three simple return 
 
46 The date upon which a hedge fund first reports data to Bloomberg is unavailable. Therefore, we do not know the 
exact number of backfilled returns for any given fund. The 24-month correction is consistent with both Jagannathan, 
Malakhov, and Novikov (2010) and Titman and Tiu (2011). 
47 We thank David Hsieh for making the trend-following factor data available at his website. 
https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/HFRFData.htm 
48 For example, Aragon (2007) and Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) both find funds with lockup restrictions 




based measures: average return, Sharpe ratio, and MAX of Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2019). We 
also consider five regression based measures from FH8 model: alpha, t-statistic of alpha, R2 of 
Titman and Tiu (2011), systematic risk of Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2013) and beta activity of 
Duanmu, Malakhov, and McCumber (2018). Prior studies usually focus on one past horizon to 
calculate predictors. However, since machine learning models can sort out the most relevant 
predictors and therefore allow us to flexibly consider multiple horizons for the same predictive 
variable. We include up to four different horizons for a give variable.49 This leads to a total number 
of 22 predictors: 
(7) Fund average return (Ret_1year), Sharpe ratio (Sharpe_1year), and MAX using fund 
past one year’s fund returns; 
(8) Fund average return (Ret_2year), Sharpe ratio (Sharpe_2year), FH8 alpha 
(Alpha_2year), t-statistic of FH8 alpha (Talpha_2year), R2 (R2_2year), and systematic 
risk (Sys.Risk_2year) using fund past two years’ fund returns; 
(9) Fund average return (Ret_3year), Sharpe ratio (Sharpe_3year), FH8 alpha 
(Alpha_3year), t-statistic of FH8 alpha (Talpha_3year), R2 (R2_3year), and systematic 
risk (Sys.Risk_3year) using fund past three years’ fund returns; 
(10) Fund average return (Ret_4year), Sharpe ratio (Sharpe_4year), FH8 alpha 
(Alpha_4year), t-statistic of FH8 alpha (Talpha_4year), R2 (R2_4year), systematic risk 
(Sys.Risk_4year) and beta activity (Beta Activity) using fund past four years’ fund 
returns. 
 
49 To reduce measurement error, we do not include regression-based variables using one year’s returns. Also, to avoid 
extremely high correlation, we only include MAX from the past one year’s returns. Beta Activity measure uses past 




2.2.3. Training and prediction 
The general machine learning framework in this study is to train different models to learn 
the relation between the 22 predictors and two-year-ahead FH8 alpha, and then apply the fitted 
model to a testing dataset for predictions. 
Specifically, to predict two-year-ahead FH8 alpha at the beginning of year t, we fit different 
models with the training dataset which is a cross-sectional dataset with the FH8 alpha calculated 
from year t-1 and year t-2 and 22 predictors for each fund calculated using four years’ data from 
year t-6 to year t-3. For example, since our full sample starts from January 1996 and ends in 
December 2018, the first training set uses the data from 1996 to 2001. We fit different models with 
the 22 predictors calculated using 1996 to 1999 data and the FH8 alpha calculated using 2000 and 
2001 data. Next, we predict the two-year-ahead FH8 alpha for year 2002 and 2003 at the beginning 
of year 2002 by applying the fitted model from training dataset on the testing dataset with 22 
predictors. We repeat the procedure to predict two-year-ahead FH8 alpha for each fund that has 22 
predictors available every year starting from 2002 to 2017. 
2.2.4. Machine learning models 
We use two linear models and three nonlinear regression tree-based models. The first linear 
model we consider is multiple linear regression model estimated via ordinary least squares (OLS). 
The second linear model we use is the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO).50 
Unlike OLS, which estimates the coefficients for all the predictors, LASSO forces some of the 
irrelevant coefficient estimates to be zero and thus performs predictor selection.  
Although linear models have advantages in interpretation, it is arbitrary to assume the 
relation between predictors and the dependent variable to be linear. Therefore, we also include 
 




three nonlinear models in this study. There are many nonlinear machine learning models available. 
However, some of them are more suitable for classification problems such as support vector 
machine, and some of them perform more like a black box such as neural network. Considering 
the trade-off between flexibility and interpretation, we choose three tree-based models—bagged 
regression trees (Bag.Tree), random forest (RF), and boosted regression trees (Boost.Tree)—as the 
representatives of nonlinear models in this study.51 
2.2.5. Prediction evaluation 
The main research question of this study is whether machine learn can ex ante identify 
funds that deliver superior performance subsequently. To address this question, we train machine 
learning models to predict two-year-ahead FH8 alpha. We use two approaches to evaluate the 
predictions. The first approach uses statistical measures to compare the predicted values and the 
realized values in the testing dataset. First, we compute mean squared error (MSE), correlation 
coefficient, and out-of-sample R2 between predicted and realized values of two-year-ahead FH8 
alpha for all the five models. The out-of-sample R2 (𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑆
2 ) is calculated as: 
 
𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑆
2 = 1 −
∑ (𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦?̂?)
2𝑛
1
∑ (𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦?̅?)2
𝑛
1
 (2.1)  
where 𝑦𝑖 is the realized value of two-year-ahead FH8 alpha, 𝑦?̂? is predicted value from a given 
machine learning model, and 𝑦?̅? is the mean of realized value of two-year-ahead FH8 alphas. 
Next, to compare the prediction accuracy between two models we conduct the Diebold and 
Mariano (1995) test. The test statistic for comparing the predictions of model (1) and (2) is 
calculated as: 
 
51 See James, Witten, Hastie, and Tibshirani (2013) or Friedman, Hastie, and Tibshirani (2001) for detailed description 






























 are the prediction error for fund j in a testing dataset using model (1) and model (2). 
Second and more importantly, we form portfolios on the predictions and then evaluate the out-of-
sample performance of all the machine learning portfolios. This approach evaluates whether 
machine learning predictions add value to hedge fund investors. 
2.3. Prediction accuracy evaluation 
Table 2.2 reports the MSE, correlation and 𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑆
2  between the predicted and realized FH8 
alpha. In the testing dataset, not all funds that have 22 predictors exist in the next two years, 
therefore not all funds in the testing set have a realized FH8 alpha. However, since this is the case 
for all the models, the comparison is still a fair comparison. Table 2 shows that random forest 
performs the best, having lowest MSE, highest correlation and highest 𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑆
2  among the five 
models, while OLS performs the worst, having the highest MSE, lowest correlation and lowest 
𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑆
2 .  
Next, we conduct pairwise comparisons between models using Diebold and Mariano (1995) 
test. In Table 2.3, a positive value in the table suggests the model in the column has better 
prediction accuracy than the model in the row. Again, we find random forest outperforms any other 
four models and OLS underperforms any other four models although not significantly so. These 
initial assessments using statistical measures suggest that on average random forest shows great 




2.4. Performance of machine learning portfolios 
Above tests examine the prediction accuracy of all funds that have a realized two-year-
ahead FH8 alpha. However, the more important question is whether machine learning predictions 
can identify the funds that deliver superior performance subsequently and thus create value to 
hedge fund investors. To answer this question, we form equal weight decile portfolios based on 
machine learning predictions and evaluate the out-of-sample performance of those portfolios. 
Specifically, at the beginning of each year starting from 2002 to 2017, we sort funds based on the 
predicted FH8 alpha from a given machine learning model into deciles. Considering the lockup 
and redemption restrictions hedge fund investors may face, we rebalance all the portfolios annually 
instead of commonly used monthly rebalancing in literature. For the funds stop reporting in the 
database in the holding period, we equally distribute the cumulative value of those funds to the 
remaining funds in the portfolio. This yields five top machine learning portfolios and five bottom 
machine learning portfolios from five models based on model predictions of FH8 alpha. 
Figure 2.1 shows the value of one-dollar investment in each portfolio over the period of 
January 2002 to December 2017. For illustration purpose, we equal weight the top portfolios of 
OLS and LASSO and equal weight the top portfolios of the three tree-based models. For 
comparison, we also form an equal weight portfolio of all the hedge funds in the database and add 
cumulative return of SP500 over the same period. Figure 1 shows that one dollar invested in the 
top portfolio of linear machine learning models at the beginning of 2002 is worth $7.03 at the end 
of 2017 and one dollar invested in the top portfolio of three based models is worth $5.21. 
Meanwhile, the equal weight portfolio of all hedge funds only has a value of $2.5, which is even 




confirm that hedge fund performance has weakened after 2008. Therefore, identifying winning 
funds ex ante becomes even more valuable. 
Table 2.4 evaluates risk adjusted performance using FH8 model and other common 
performance metrics for all the machine learning portfolios. Panel A of Table 2.4 shows that all 
the top machine learning portfolios deliver positive and significant FH8 alpha. LASSO portfolio 
generates monthly FH8 alpha of 0.65% (t-stat = 3.52), and even the lowest top machine learning 
portfolio from OLS model delivers monthly FH8 alpha of 0.43% (t-stat = 2.24). Untabulated test 
of pairwise comparisons of the alphas from five top machine learning portfolios shows that 
LASSO statistically significantly outperforms other models.52 The performance of all the bottom 
machine learning portfolios does not significantly differ from zero. Since we require funds to have 
past four years’ returns to enter in the sample, all the sample funds have survived at least six years. 
Given the failure rate in hedge fund industry, the average sample fund is better than the average 
hedge fund of the industry. Therefore, it is not surprising that the bottom portfolios do not have 
significant negative alphas. Since investors cannot short hedge funds, we focus on top portfolios. 
Even so, the long short portfolios still have impressive positive alphas. Since we train all the 
models to predict FH8 alpha, we focus on evaluating whether all the portfolios deliver FH8 alpha 
out-of-sample. If we evaluate them with alternative factor models, all the machine learning 
portfolios still generate positive alphas, albeit statistically weaker.53 
Panel B of Table 2.4 evaluates all the machine learning portfolios with model free measures 
such as average return, Sharpe ratio and attrition rate. Again, top LASSO portfolio has the highest 
 
52 The monthly alpha of the top portfolio from LASSO is 0.22% (t-stat = 2.21) higher than the one from OLS, 0.21% 
(t-stat = 2.25) higher than the one from boosted tree, 0.19% (t-stat = 1.92) higher than the one from bagged tree, and 
0.16% (t-stat = 1.76) higher than the one from random forest. 
53 The results using Global 4 factor model and Global 7 factor model in Joenväärä, Kauppila, Kosowski, and Tolonen 




average monthly return of 1.1%, the highest Sharpe ratio of 0.3 and lowest average annual attrition 
rate of 0.08 among the five top machine learning portfolios.  
Although both press and research studies find the performance of hedge fund industry has 
declined in the recent decade, we investigate whether machine learning can still select a subset of 
funds that deliver superior performance for this period. To do so, we replicate our analysis in Table 
2.4 for two subperiods. Motivated by Bollen, Joenväärä, and Kauppila (2020), which finds 2008 
is the crucial point of the change of the performance of hedge fund industry, we also use 2008 as 
the break point. Therefore, we evaluate the all the machine learning portfolios over the two 
subperiods: January 2002 to December 2007 and January 2008 to December 2017. Table 2.5 
presents the results. All the top machine learning portfolios produce positive FH8 alphas over the 
two subperiods. FH8 alphas of five top portfolios are weaker during 2002 to 2007 but even stronger 
during 2008 to 2017. Fewer observations in the first subperiod may partially explain the lower t-
statistics for this period. However, LASSO consistently produce the highest FH8 alpha among the 
five models over each period.  
In terms of other performance metrics, although the average return and Sharpe ratio of 
machine learning portfolios declined over 2008 to 2017, they still deliver impressive returns. For 
example, the LASSO portfolio has an average monthly return of 0.97%, a Sharpe ratio of 0.23, 
while SP500 has an average monthly return of 0.75% and a Sharpe ratio of 0.17 over the same 
period. 
Taken together, the results from Table 2.4 to Table 2.5 show that all the machine learning 
portfolios are able to select a subset of funds that outperform subsequently, even for the period 




disappointing. Among the five machine learning portfolios, LASSO consistently outperform other 
models in identifying winning funds.  
2.5. Predictor importance 
2.5.1. Average relative importance 
We next examine which predictors are more important among all the 22 predictors. Figure 
2.2 reports the most important ten predictors in OLS, LASSO, random forest and boosted 
regression trees.54 The predictor importance of OLS is ranked using the average of absolute value 
of t-statistic of each coefficient across 16 sample years. The predictor importance of LASSO is 
ranked using the average of absolute value of t-statistic of coefficient estimates from OLS 
estimation of the selected predictors by LASSO. Predictor importance of random forest is 
calculated using the mean decrease in Gini index. Importance of boosted regression trees is 
calculated from the relative influence of predictors. All the measures are scaled so the most 
important predictor has a value of 100.  
It is important to note that all the rankings are within a given model. However, we still find 
that several predictors are ranked in top ten by all models. They are 1-year average return, 4-year 
average return, MAX, 2-year alpha, 3-year alpha, 2-year systematic risk, 4-year systematic risk 
and beta activity. In contrast, 2-year R2, 3-year R2, 4-year R2, 2-year Talpha, 3-year Talpha, 4-year 
Talpha, 3-year Sharpe ratio and 4-year Sharpe ratio are ranked in the bottom ten by all models.  
 Overall, average return, MAX, FH8 alpha, systematic risk, and beta activity are 
consistently selected as important predictors for FH8 alpha by different machine learning models, 
while R2, Talpha and Sharpe ratio are relatively not so important. In addition, these results also 
 
54 Since bagged regression trees do not provide variable importance, we only report the relative importance for the 




suggest that predictors with different horizons each provide incremental information on predicting 
fund future performance. 
2.5.2. Time-varying importance 
Prior work on individual performance predictors usually implicitly assumes the predictor 
is of the same importance across time. However, Sun, Wang, and Zheng (2018) show that the 
persistence of hedge fund performance only shows up following weak hedge fund market 
conditions but not in strong markets. Kacperczyk, van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2014) also 
show that skilled mutual managers focus more on stock picking during boom market while focus 
more on market timing during recession.  
Since fund managers shift their skill with different market states and fund performance 
persistence is conditional on market conditions, it is suboptimal to assume the importance of a 
predictor to be constant. Using machine learning to predict subsequent fund performance, we relax 
this assumption and allow the importance of a predictor to vary over time. The empirical results 
also show that the importance of predictors indeed varies considerably over time.  
Figure 2.3 shows the relative importance of past 2-year alpha and beta activity from 
LASSO during our sample period. A value of 100 means the predictor is selected by LASSO as 
the most important predictor among all the 22 predictors in that year. A value of zero means the 
predictor is not selected by LASSO as a relevant predictor in that year. For example, LASSO 
identifies beta activity as the most important predictor in 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008 and suggests 
past 2-year alpha is not so important comparted to other predictors in 2002, 2004, 2006 but is the 
most important predictor in 2017. Figure 4 shows that absolute value of t-statistic from OLS 
estimation of a predictor that is selected by LASSO. Figure 2.4 further confirms that there is a 




For illustration purpose, we only present the time-varying importance of 2-year alpha and 
beta activity. However, the conclusion holds for all the predictors in this study. Consistent with 
the findings of prior literature, the importance of hedge fund predictors varies substantially over 
time. 
2.6. Performance of portfolios formed on individual predictors 
In this section, we examine the performance of the portfolios formed on individual 
predictors over the same period as the machine learning portfolios. Using the same set of sample 
funds, we form equal weight decile portfolios on each individual predictor and rebalance the 
portfolios annually. Table 2.6 reports the FH8 alphas of the individual portfolios. 
Table 2.6 shows that FH8 alpha differs dramatically across different predictors. Beta 
activity generates 0.5% (t-stat = 3.33) monthly alpha, which is the highest among the 22 individual 
predictors. However, alpha of top portfolio formed on past 3-year average return and alpha of top 
portfolio formed on past 4-year average return do not significantly differ from zero. Contrastingly, 
all the top machine learning portfolios in Table 2.4 delivers a significant positive alpha. Even the 
lowest alpha from machine learning portfolio has 0.43% per month. The average alpha of all the 
top machine learning portfolios is 0.49% per month, while the average alpha of all the top 
individual portfolios is only 0.31% per month. These results show the advantage of using all the 
individual predictors with machine learning than using individual predictors.  
 We also examine the performance of portfolios formed on individual predictors using 
model free measures. Table 2.7 reports the average monthly return, Sharpe ratio, and average 
annual attrition rate of all the individual portfolios. The performance of individual portfolios tends 
to align with the properties of the individual predictors. For example, portfolios formed on average 




on Sharpe ratio tend to have higher out-of-sample Sharpe ratio. Both 3-year systematic risk and 4-
year systematic risk generate highest average return, which is 0.94% per month. However, this is 
still lower than the average return of machine learning portfolio from LASSO, which generates an 
average return of 1.10% per month. To sum up, none of the portfolios formed on individual 
predictors has higher out-of-sample alpha than the machine learning portfolio using LASSO. Also, 
machine learning portfolios have good properties in all the common performance metrics while 
the performance of portfolios formed on individual predictors tend to align with the property of 
the given individual predictor. 
2.7. Machine learning portfolios and individual portfolios 
To better understand the contribution of machine learning predictions and individual 
predictors, we isolate the effects from machine learning predictions and individual predictors by 
evaluating the performance of mutually exclusive portfolios. Specifically, at the beginning of each 
year starting from 2002 to 2017, we sort funds into quintiles on two measures separately. Then we 
form one mutually exclusive portfolio with funds in the top quintile of measure A but not in the 
top quintile of measure B and form the other mutually exclusive portfolio with funds in the top 
quintile of measure B but not in the top quintile of measure A.  
We use the machine learning portfolios from LASSO and OLS—the strongest and the 
weakest machine learning portfolios in Table 2.4—to from mutually exclusive portfolios with 
classical individual predictors in literature and with individual predictors that demonstrate 
predictive power in our previous analysis.  
Table 2.8 shows that performance of mutually exclusive portfolios formed on LASSO 
prediction and individual predictors. Let us take the performance of top LASSO and 1-R2_2year 




in the top 1-R2_2year quintile from the top LASSO predictions quintile, the top LASSO portfolio 
still delivers a significant alpha, while the top 1-R2_2year portfolio excluding funds common to 
the top LASSO portfolio barely retain the significance in alpha. The same pattern presents in all 
the mutually exclusive portfolios. In all the cases, LASSO portfolios retain its significant alpha 
after excluding the common funds to the top portfolio of individual predictor, while in several 
cases the alpha of individual portfolios totally disappeared after excluding the funds in the top 
LASSO portfolio. For example, beta activity and MAX generate significant alpha in Table 2.6 
(0.5% and 0.4% separately), however, once we isolate the effect from LASSO prediction, those 
two predictors deliver no significant alpha out-of-sample.  
In addition, after excluding the common funds, LASSO portfolio almost always dominates 
the portfolio of an individual predictor in all other performance metrics, delivering a higher 
average return, higher Sharpe ratio, and lower attrition rate. Except for a few cases, the LASSO 
portfolio has a slightly higher attrition rate. The last column of Table 2.8 reports the proportion of 
funds in one top portfolio but not in the other top portfolio. This measure shows that there is a 
substantial proportion of funds identified by the LASSO prediction as outperforming funds but not 
by individual predictors.  
 We further evaluate the performance of machine learning portfolios and individual 
portfolios by forming the mutually exclusive portfolios using the weakest machine learning 
predictions from OLS with individual predictors in Table 2.9. Table 2.9 shows a similar pattern as 
Table 2.8. Machine learning portfolio still delivers significant and positive alpha after we isolate 
the effect from individual predictors. However, the performance of individual predictors 




alphas of 2-year systematic risk and MAX disappear after we exclude the top funds identified by 
machine learning.  
These results show that the machine learning portfolios retain their long-term out-of-
sample predictive power while the reverse is not true for individual predictors, suggesting machine 
learning methods unveil unique information of future hedge fund performance that is not captured 
by individual predictors. 
2.8. Conclusion 
Although the performance of the hedge fund industry has, on average, been disappointing 
in the past decade, we find that machine learning models can still consistently identify funds that 
outperform. We train five machine learning models to predict two-year-ahead alpha using 22 
measures. Based on those predictions, we then form equal weight, annually rebalanced portfolios. 
The machine learning portfolio formed using LASSO delivers, over the period 2002 to 2017, a 
7.8% alpha per year, a 13.2% average return per year, and a 0.3 Sharpe ratio. 
Unlike traditional methods, which typically sort on one predictor and implicitly assume 
time-invariant predictive power, we train our machine learning models to continually re-identify 
the important predictors. We find that average return, alpha, MAX, systematic risk, and beta 
activity are consistently selected as important predictors, but the importance of all of the predictors 
is time-varying. Since Harvey, Liu, and Zhu (2016), there is a growing debate about the persistence 
of predictors in the literature. Our models acknowledge that debate by dynamically updating based 
on new information about the utility of each predictor. 
To compare with traditional methods, we also form 22 portfolios based on the individual 
predictors. We find that, in terms of alpha, none of the individual predictor portfolios outperforms 




portfolios is 3.72% per year, compared to 5.88% per year for the machine learning portfolios. 
Isolating the contribution of the individual predictors shows that machine learning process 




Table 2.1: Summary statistics: 1994 – 2018 
This table reports the summary statistics for all hedge funds between January 1994 and December 
2018. Panel A reports the cross-sectional mean, median, 10th percentile, 90th percentile, standard 
deviation of fund characteristics. Panel B reports the number of hedge funds and the average and 
standard deviation of monthly returns of an equal weight portfolio of all hedge funds in the 
database by year. 
Panel A. Fund characteristics      
  Mean Median P10 P90 Std.Dev. 
Monthly excess return (%) 0.35 0.39 -4.08 4.73 3.85 
Assets (millions $) 158.85 45.40 3.97 428.15 305.65 
Minimum investment (million $) 0.85 0.25 0.03 1.00 1.71 
Management fee (%) 1.46 1.50 0.90 2.00 0.57 
Performance fee (%) 17.20 20.00 5.00 20.00 6.59 
Hurdle rate (%) 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.43 
Lockup period (days) 61.12 0.00 0.00 360.00 145.86 
Redemption notice (days) 15.25 0.00 0.00 60.00 24.74 




Table 2.1 (Cont.) 
Panel B: Equal-weight portfolio of all hedge funds 
Year Number of funds Mean Return Std.Dev. 
1994 309 0.19 0.96 
1995 402 1.77 1.27 
1996 561 1.68 1.65 
1997 741 1.54 1.99 
1998 922 0.59 2.21 
1999 1318 2.08 2.28 
2000 1726 0.85 2.42 
2001 2322 0.51 1.28 
2002 3145 0.55 1.20 
2003 4107 1.83 1.40 
2004 5163 0.88 1.60 
2005 6204 0.52 1.44 
2006 7100 1.21 1.74 
2007 7940 1.08 1.71 
2008 8213 -1.61 3.59 
2009 7737 1.66 2.59 
2010 7816 0.76 2.80 
2011 7876 -0.50 2.56 
2012 7361 0.47 1.80 
2013 6837 0.63 1.38 
2014 6382 -0.03 1.21 
2015 6024 -0.23 1.36 
2016 5549 0.19 1.58 
2017 5205 1.00 0.59 





Table 2.2: Prediction accuracy 
This table shows the mean squared error, correlation and 𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑆
2  of predicted value and realized 
value of two-year-ahead FH8 alpha for five models. 
  OLS LASSO Bag.Tree RF Boost.Tree 
MSE 3.11 1.45 1.43 1.39 1.65 
Correlation 0.07 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.10 
𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑆




Table 2.3: Comparing predictions using Diebold-Mariano tests 
This table shows pairwise Diebold-Mariano test statistics comparing prediction accuracy among 
five models. A positive number indicates the model in the column outperforms the model in the 
row. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
  LASSO Bag.Tree RF Boost.Tree 
OLS 1.45 1.45 1.48 1.31 
LASSO  -0.20 0.49 -3.27*** 
Bag.Tree   3.32*** -2.92*** 





Table 2.4: Performance of machine learning portfolios 
This table shows the performance of annually rebalanced portfolios of hedge funds formed based 
on machine learning predictions. At the beginning of each year, we sort the funds into deciles 
based on their predicted two-year-ahead FH8 alpha from a machine learning model. The ‘Top’ 
portfolio is an equal weight portfolio of all the funds in the highest predicted value decile. The 
‘Btm’ portfolio is an equal weight portfolio of all the funds in the lowest predicted value decile. 
The period of evaluation for the portfolios is January 2002 through December 2017. Panel A 
reports the FH8 alpha of all the portfolios. t-statistics are in brackets below each alpha ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Panel B shows the average 
return, Sharpe ratio, and average annual attrition rate of all the portfolios. 
Panel A: FH8 alpha 
  OLS LASSO Bag.Tree RF Boost.Tree 
Top 0.43** 0.65*** 0.46*** 0.49*** 0.44*** 
 [2.24] [3.52] [2.84] [2.90] [2.92] 
Btm 0.01 -0.09 -0.11 -0.16 -0.00 
 [0.09] [-0.59] [-0.85] [-1.16] [-0.02] 
Top - Btm 0.42 0.75** 0.57** 0.65*** 0.44** 
  [1.48] [2.58] [2.54] [2.65] [2.19] 
 
Panel B: Other performance measures 
    OLS LASSO Bag.Tree RF Boost.Tree 
Average Return 
Top 0.87 1.10 0.80 0.84 0.80 
Btm 0.31 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.32 
Top - Btm 0.56 0.87 0.58 0.64 0.48 
Sharpe Ratio 
Top 0.24 0.30 0.25 0.26 0.25 
Btm 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.13 
Top - Btm 0.12 0.23 0.18 0.19 0.12 
Attrition Rate 
Top 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.10 
Btm 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.12 





Table 2.5: Performance of machine learning portfolios – subperiods 
This table shows the results for two subperiods of the tests in Table 2.4. Panel A reports the FH8 
alpha of all the machine learning portfolios in Table 2.4 for the period of January 2002 to 
December 2007. Panel B reports the FH8 alpha of all the machine learning portfolios in Table 2.4 
for the period of January 2008 to December 2017. Panel C reports the average return, Sharpe ratio, 
and average annual attrition rate of all the portfolios for the period of January 2002 to December 
2007. Panel D reports the average return, Sharpe ratio, and average annual attrition rate of all the 
portfolios for the period of January 2008 to December 2017. 
Panel A: FH8 alpha (2002 – 2007) 
  OLS LASSO Bag.Tree RF Boost.Tree 
Top 0.38* 0.72*** 0.25 0.31 0.39* 
 [1.97] [2.81] [1.13] [1.28] [1.75] 
Btm 0.26 0.20 0.29 0.29 0.34** 
 [1.33] [0.82] [1.61] [1.57] [2.09] 
Top - Btm 0.12 0.52 -0.04 0.02 0.05 
  [0.45] [1.30] [-0.13] [0.05] [0.19] 
Panel B: FH8 alpha (2008 – 2017) 
  OLS LASSO Bag.Tree RF Boost.Tree 
Top 0.71** 0.74*** 0.62*** 0.62** 0.52** 
 [2.50] [2.91] [2.69] [2.60] [2.50] 
Btm -0.27 -0.35* -0.28 -0.36* -0.22 
 [-1.51] [-1.77] [-1.56] [-1.92] [-1.27] 
Top - Btm 0.98** 1.09*** 0.90*** 0.98*** 0.74** 
  [2.47] [2.77] [2.85] [2.81] [2.60] 
Panel C: Other performance measures (2002 – 2007) 
    OLS LASSO Bag.Tree RF Boost.Tree 
Average Return 
Top 0.83 1.32 0.96 1.00 1.06 
Btm 1.08 0.99 0.83 0.82 0.99 
Top - Btm -0.26 0.34 0.13 0.18 0.07 
Sharpe Ratio 
Top 0.36 0.52 0.38 0.39 0.41 
Btm 0.41 0.34 0.38 0.40 0.47 
Top - Btm -0.05 0.18 0.00 0.00 -0.06 
Attrition Rate 
Top 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.10 
Btm 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.12 
Top - Btm -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
Panel D: Other performance measures (2008 – 2017) 
    OLS LASSO Bag.Tree RF Boost.Tree 
Average Return 
Top 0.89 0.97 0.70 0.74 0.65 
Btm -0.16 -0.23 -0.15 -0.18 -0.08 
Top - Btm 1.05 1.20 0.85 0.92 0.73 
Sharpe Ratio 
Top 0.21 0.23 0.20 0.21 0.19 
Btm -0.06 -0.08 -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 
Top - Btm 0.27 0.32 0.25 0.27 0.22 
Attrition Rate 
Top 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.10 
Btm 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.12 








Table 2.6: Performance of portfolios formed on individual predictors – FH8 alpha 
This table shows the FH8 alpha of annually rebalanced portfolios of hedge funds formed on one predictor of all the 22 predictors in this 
study. At the beginning of each year, we sort the funds into deciles based their value of a given predictor. The ‘Top’ portfolio is an equal 
weight portfolio of all the funds in the highest value of the predictor. The ‘Btm’ portfolio is an equal weight portfolio of all the funds in 
the lowest value of the predictor. The period of evaluation for the portfolios is January 2002 through December 2017. t-statistics are in 
brackets below each alpha ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
  Ret_1year Sharpe_1year MAX     
Top 0.32* 0.33*** 0.40**     
 [1.79] [4.35] [2.24]     
Btm 0.21 0.05 0.09*     
 [1.23] [0.41] [1.71]     
Top - Btm 0.12 0.28** 0.31*     
  [0.41] [2.07] [1.73]     
        
  Ret_2year Sharpe_2year Alpha_2year Talpha_2year 1-R2_2year Sys.Risk_2year  
Top 0.29* 0.29*** 0.39*** 0.35*** 0.19*** 0.31*  
 [1.70] [4.23] [3.02] [6.35] [2.69] [1.78]  
Btm 0.22 0.08 0.14 0.06 0.09 0.18***  
 [1.35] [0.65] [1.00] [0.57] [0.94] [4.80]  
Top - Btm 0.06 0.21 0.25 0.29*** 0.11 0.13  
  [0.24] [1.55] [1.45] [2.72] [1.06] [0.76]  
 
  Ret_3year Sharpe_3year Alpha_3year Talpha_3year 1-R2_3year Sys.Risk_3year  
Top 0.20 0.24*** 0.43*** 0.30*** 0.19*** 0.31*  
 [1.25] [3.75] [3.26] [6.06] [2.84] [1.77]  
Btm 0.32** 0.20 0.10 0.09 0.02 0.19***  
 [2.00] [1.48] [0.76] [0.78] [0.22] [5.03]  
Top - Btm -0.12 0.04 0.33* 0.21* 0.17* 0.12  
  [-0.48] [0.30] [1.95] [1.97] [1.86] [0.67]  
        
  Ret_4year Sharpe_4year Alpha_4year Talpha_4year 1-R2_4year Sys.Risk_4year Beta Activity 
Top 0.25 0.22*** 0.44*** 0.28*** 0.21*** 0.34** 0.50*** 
 [1.58] [3.63] [3.49] [5.75] [3.36] [1.99] [3.33] 
Btm 0.14 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.20*** 0.06 
 [0.94] [0.69] [0.10] [0.06] [0.53] [5.17] [0.41] 
Top - Btm 0.11 0.13 0.43*** 0.27** 0.17* 0.14 0.44** 







Table 2.7: Performance of portfolios formed on individual predictors – other measures 
This table shows the average return, Sharpe ratio, and average annual attrition rate of all the portfolios in Table 2.6. 
    Ret_1year Sharpe_1year MAX    
Average Return 
Top 0.75 0.47 0.92    
Btm 0.56 0.26 0.17    
Top - Btm 0.19 0.21 0.75    
Sharpe Ratio 
Top 0.24 0.40 0.25    
Btm 0.16 0.12 0.19    
Top - Btm 0.08 0.28 0.06    
Attrition Rate 
Top 0.06 0.06 0.10    
Btm 0.17 0.18 0.14    
Top - Btm -0.11 -0.12 -0.05    
        
    Ret_2year Sharpe_2year Alpha_2year Talpha_2year 1-R2_2year Sys.Risk_2year 
Average Return 
Top 0.64 0.39 0.68 0.49 0.35 0.93 
Btm 0.59 0.33 0.60 0.44 0.63 0.25 
Top - Btm 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.05 -0.28 0.68 
Sharpe Ratio 
Top 0.20 0.34 0.27 0.42 0.29 0.21 
Btm 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.38 
Top - Btm 0.01 0.19 0.09 0.25 0.12 -0.17 
Attrition Rate 
Top 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.11 
Btm 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.09 0.11 







Table 2.7 (Cont.) 
    Ret_3year Sharpe_3year Alpha_3year Talpha_3year 1-R2_3year Sys.Risk_3year  
Average Return 
Top 0.60 0.35 0.72 0.42 0.32 0.94  
Btm 0.64 0.47 0.54 0.46 0.58 0.25  
Top - Btm -0.04 -0.11 0.18 -0.04 -0.26 0.68  
Sharpe Ratio 
Top 0.19 0.32 0.31 0.41 0.30 0.21  
Btm 0.22 0.20 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.39  
Top - Btm -0.03 0.12 0.14 0.24 0.14 -0.19  
Attrition Rate 
Top 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.11  
Btm 0.19 0.20 0.15 0.17 0.09 0.12  
Top - Btm -0.13 -0.14 -0.09 -0.10 0.04 -0.01  
         
    Ret_4year Sharpe_4year Alpha_4year Talpha_4year 1-R2_4year Sys.Risk_4year Beta Activity 
Average Return 
Top 0.62 0.33 0.71 0.40 0.34 0.94 0.83 
Btm 0.55 0.42 0.49 0.40 0.63 0.27 0.47 
Top - Btm 0.07 -0.09 0.23 0.00 -0.29 0.67 0.36 
Sharpe Ratio 
Top 0.19 0.30 0.30 0.38 0.34 0.21 0.32 
Btm 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.41 0.14 
Top - Btm 0.00 0.13 0.15 0.23 0.18 -0.20 0.18 
Attrition Rate 
Top 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.13 0.10 0.11 
Btm 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.08 0.11 0.09 




Table 2.8: Machine learning portfolio (LASSO) and classical portfolio 
This table shows the results of annually rebalanced portfolios double sorted on machine learning 
prediction from LASSO and classical individual predictors. For example, LASSO excl. 1-
R2_2year is the portfolio of funds in the top quintile of machine learning prediction from LASSO, 
excluding funds in the top quintile of 1-R2_2year measure. The period of evaluation for the 
portfolios is January 2002 through December 2017. t-statistics are in brackets below FH8 alpha 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Attrition 
Rate is the average annual rate at which funds stop reporting. Proportion is the average of the 
proportion of funds in the top quintile of one measure but not in the top quintile of another measure. 
  FH8 alpha Average Return Sharpe Ratio Attrition Rate Proportion 
LASSO excl. 1-R2_2year 0.55*** 0.97 0.31 0.07 
0.75 
 [3.57]    
1-R2_2year excl. LASSO 0.15* 0.30 0.23 0.13 
 [1.86]    
LASSO excl. Sys.Risk_3year 0.46*** 0.70 0.39 0.08 
0.65 
 [4.51]    
Sys.Risk_3year excl. LASSO 0.07 0.53 0.15 0.10 
 [0.47]    
LASSO excl. Sys.Risk_2year 0.45*** 0.69 0.37 0.08 
0.66 
 [4.55]    
Sys.Risk_2year excl. LASSO 0.05 0.49 0.14 0.10 
 [0.30]    
LASSO excl. Beta Activity 0.44*** 0.84 0.26 0.08 
0.76 
 [2.62]    
Beta Activity excl. LASSO  0.16 0.45 0.22 0.13 
 [1.39]    
LASSO excl. MAX 0.46*** 0.79 0.33 0.08 
0.68 
 [3.91]    
MAX excl. LASSO 0.11 0.52 0.17 0.09 
 [0.74]    
LASSO excl. Ret_1year 0.56*** 0.88 0.31 0.09 
0.67 
 [3.72]    
Ret_1year excl. LASSO 0.17 0.54 0.20 0.07 
 [1.15]    
LASSO excl.Sharpe_1year 0.58*** 0.97 0.31 0.09 
0.72 
 [3.58]    
Sharpe_1year excl. LASSO 0.21** 0.39 0.27 0.07 
 [2.51]    
LASSO excl. Alpha_2year 0.55*** 0.95 0.32 0.09 
0.68 
 [3.50]    
Alpha_2year excl. LASSO 0.25** 0.51 0.23 0.07 
 [2.19]    
LASSO excl. Alpha_3year 0.53*** 0.90 0.31 0.08 
0.68 
 [3.47]    
Alpha_3year excl. LASSO 0.23** 0.46 0.22 0.07 
 [2.04]    
LASSO excl. Talpha_3year 0.57*** 0.97 0.31 0.09 
0.73 
 [3.50]    
Talpha_3year excl. LASSO 0.27*** 0.43 0.30 0.07 





Table 2.9: Machine learning portfolio (OLS) and classical portfolio 
This table shows the results of annually rebalanced portfolios double sorted on machine learning 
prediction from OLS and classical individual predictors. For example, OLS excl. 1-R2_2year is 
the portfolio of funds in the top quintile of machine learning prediction from OLS, excluding funds 
in the top quintile of 1-R2_2year measure. The period of evaluation for the portfolios is January 
2002 through December 2017. t-statistics are in brackets below FH8 alpha ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Attrition Rate is the average annual rate at 
which funds stop reporting. Proportion is the average of the proportion of funds in the top quintile 
of one measure but not in the top quintile of another measure. 
  FH8 alpha Average Return Sharpe Ratio Attrition Rate Proportion 
OLS excl. 1-R2_2year 0.40** 0.78 0.25 0.08 
0.78  
[2.58]    
1-R2_2year excl. OLS 0.20*** 0.33 0.26 0.12 
 [2.69]    
OLS excl. Sys.Risk_3year 0.37*** 0.60 0.34 0.09 
0.64  
[3.82]    
Sys.Risk_3year excl. OLS 0.05 0.56 0.15 0.10 
 [0.28]    
OLS excl. Sys.Risk_2year 0.35*** 0.58 0.31 0.09 
0.65  
[3.67]    
Sys.Risk_2year excl. OLS 0.00 0.51 0.14 0.10 
 [0.02]    
OLS excl. Beta Activity 0.31* 0.66 0.22 0.08 
0.73  
[1.97]    
Beta Activity excl. OLS  0.27** 0.56 0.27 0.11 
 [2.40]    
OLS excl. MAX 0.37*** 0.66 0.28 0.09 
0.66  
[3.07]    
MAX excl. OLS 0.12 0.57 0.18 0.09 
 [0.79]    
OLS excl. Ret_1year 0.42*** 0.73 0.26 0.11 
0.70  
[2.85]    
Ret_1year excl. OLS 0.19 0.58 0.21 0.06 
 [1.26]    
OLS excl. Sharpe_1year 0.40** 0.78 0.25 0.10 
0.72  
[2.51]    
Sharpe_1year excl. OLS 0.25*** 0.44 0.31 0.07 
 [3.10]    
OLS excl. Alpha_2year 0.36** 0.73 0.24 0.10 
0.73  
[2.31]    
Alpha_2year excl. OLS 0.29** 0.53 0.25 0.06 
 [2.59]    
OLS excl. Alpha_3year 0.34** 0.71 0.24 0.10 
0.74  
[2.26]    
Alpha_3year excl. OLS 0.23** 0.47 0.23 0.07 
 [2.13]    
OLS excl. Talpha_3year 0.38** 0.78 0.25 0.10 
0.77  
[2.41]    
Talpha_3year excl. OLS 0.38** 0.46 0.31 0.06 








Figure 2.1: Value of machine learning portfolios 
This figure shows the changing value of $1 invested in January 2002 through December 2017 in three equal weight portfolios of mutual 
funds and SP500 index. The HF portfolio is an equal weight portfolio of all hedge funds. Portfolio of linear models is an equal weight 
portfolio of two top decile portfolios formed on the predicted value of two-year-ahead FH8 from LASSO and OLS. Portfolio of tree-
based models is an equal weight portfolio of three top decile portfolios formed on the predicted value of two-year-ahead FH8 from 



















































































































































































































Figure 2.2: Predictor importance 
This figure shows the top 10 most important predictors in each model. Predictor importance is an average of all training samples. The 
predictor with the highest importance is normalized to 100.




















































Figure 2.3: Predictor time vary importance – relative importance 
This figure shows the relative importance of Alpha_2year and Beta Activity from LASSO each 
year from 2002 to 2017. A value of 100 indicates the preidctor is the most important predictor 




















Figure 2.4: Predictor time vary importance – absolute importance 
This figure shows the absolute importance of Alpha_2year and Beta Activity from LASSO each 
year from 2002 to 2017. The value of importance is the absolute value of t-statistic from OLS 

















Chapter 3. How Risky Is Your Manager? Maximum Drawdown as Predictor of Mutual 
Fund Performance and Flows 
Timothy B. Riley, Qing Yan 
3.1. Introduction 
Academic studies of actively managed mutual funds tend to focus on risk-adjusted 
performance, not on risk alone. When risk is directly considered, it is typically measured as 
volatility or beta. However, in practice, maximum drawdown—which measures the largest decline 
in a fund’s value from peak to trough—is widely used. In this study, we comprehensively evaluate 
this standard industry measure. We consider both (i) whether maximum drawdown contains useful 
information for investors and (ii) how investors approach maximum drawdown when making 
capital allocations. In the process, we find that a number of mutual fund managers have substantial 
risk management skills. 
Maximum drawdown is not a complete measure of mutual fund risk, but for our purposes, 
it has some key characteristics. First, maximum drawdown focuses only on downside risk. A fund 
that continually increases in value by non-constant increments will have volatility, but no 
maximum drawdown. Second, maximum drawdown is easy for any investor to understand. Unlike 
other downside risk measures, such as semivariance, maximum drawdown can be quickly grasped 
by an investor with low mathematical and financial sophistication. Third, maximum drawdown is 
salient to investors. Morningstar’s website reports maximum drawdown on the same tab as 
volatility and beta, and previous research indicates that the saliency of information has a large 
effect on whether investors consider the information (e.g., Barber, Odean, and Zheng, 2005). 
We begin by estimating how risky actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds are in terms 




drawdown is 17.44%, but there is significant variation by year and style. To account for that 
variation, we style-adjust maximum drawdown within each time period. This adjusted measure, 
which we abbreviate as MDD, is used throughout our ensuing analyses. 
Our first analysis using MDD considers its predictive power with respect to mutual fund 
performance. We find that an equal weight portfolio of funds in the lowest quintile of past MDD 
has an alpha ranging from 0.61% (t-stat = 1.10) to 1.44% (t-stat = 1.94) per year. While suggestive 
of outperformance in isolation, those alphas are not statistically different from the alphas of an 
equal weight portfolio of funds in the highest quintile of past MDD. Hence, the initial results 
suggest that MDD’s power to predict fund performance is, at best, debatable. 
Nevertheless, the predictive power becomes clear when focusing on mutual funds with 
relatively strong past performance. While notable prior studies (e.g., Carhart, 1997, and Fama and 
French, 2010) present evidence that fund performance does not persist, we find that an equal 
weight portfolio of funds in the lowest quintile of past MDD and highest quintile of past 
performance has large, positive alphas ranging from 2.09% (t-stat = 2.58) to 2.68% (t-stat = 2.87) 
per year.55 Those alphas are also statistically different from and economically greater than those 
of an equal weight portfolio of funds in the highest quintile of past MDD and highest quintile of 
past performance. Given that MDD itself is also persistent, we interpret those positive alphas as 
evidence of value creation for investors through the utilization of fund managers’ risk management 
skills. 
Further performance analysis shows that the extent of value creation through those skills 
varies considerably over time. Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2017) demonstrate that the number 
of profitable opportunities in a given asset market is non-constant. When the number of profitable 
 




opportunities increases, we should expect a mutual fund’s performance to improve. Consistent 
with that logic, when von Reibnitz (2017) cross-sectional return dispersion is high—suggesting a 
turbulent market with relatively greater opportunities for profit and loss—an equal weight portfolio 
of funds in the lowest quintile of past MDD and highest quintile of past performance has an alpha 
ranging from 4.17% (t-stat = 1.98) to 5.21% (t-stat = 1.71) per year. In all other time periods, the 
alpha of that same portfolio is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Accordingly, we conclude 
that risk management skills are, perhaps unsurprisingly, most valuable when markets are turbulent. 
Risk management skills could be driven by the ability to select individual stocks or to time 
the overall market. We determine which aspect MDD is indictive of by regressing the Daniel, 
Grinblatt, Titman and, and Wermers (1997) “Characteristic Selectivity” (CS) and “Characteristic 
Timing” (CT) measures on funds’ past MDDs. We find a negative relation between MDD and CS 
but no relation between MDD and CT. In other words, managers with low MDD tend to select 
stocks better than managers with high MDD but show no difference in market timing. Those results 
suggest that the risk management skills of low MDD fund managers are driven those managers’ 
ability to select individual stocks rather their ability to time the overall market. 
We next estimate the MDD-flow relation to analyze how investors respond to maximum 
drawdown. In a panel regression setting, we find that, on average, there is a strong, negative 
relation between MDD and net flows: a 10% increase in MDD is associated with an annualized 
net outflow of 4.8% (t-stat = −6.80). Looking in the cross-section, we would expect the relation to 
be stronger among a more risk averse clientele. Fittingly, the effect on flows from increases in 
MDD for funds following an income style—who should attract a relatively risk averse clientele 
(Blackburn, Goetzmann, and Ukhov, 2009, and Polkovnichenko, Wei, and Zhao, 2019)—is almost 




be stronger when the general level of risk aversion in the market is higher. Wang and Young (2020) 
show that investors are more risk averse when there have been a greater number of recent terrorist 
attacks, and correspondingly, we find a stronger relation between fund flow and MDD when there 
has been a greater number of recent terrorist attacks. We further find that the flow-performance 
relation is flatter for funds with high MDD, which suggests that investors discount outperformance 
when it is accompanied by high MDD. Given the earlier performance results, this discounting 
seems rational, as only outperforming funds with low MDD tend to have persistent performance. 
Our results contribute to several areas of the mutual fund literature. First, our performance 
results run counter to “the conventional wisdom that active management does not create value for 
investors” (Cremers, Fulkerson, and Riley, 2019, pg. 8). We find evidence of risk management 
skills that create for investors persistently low maximum drawdowns and persistently high alphas. 
Like other work—such as Amihud and Goyenko’s (2013) selectivity—we find that revealing that 
value requires accounting for both the measure of interest (in this case, maximum drawdown) and 
past performance. Our results do not suggest universal value creation for investors through risk 
management skills, but consistent with Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers, and White (2006), our 
results do suggest that a meaningful number of fund managers do use those skills to create value. 
Second, we demonstrate that maximum drawdown has a novel effect across multiple 
mutual fund dimensions. Measures of downside risk have been considered before in the literature 
(e.g., Artavanis, Eksi, and Kadlec, 2019), as have measures of overall risk (e.g., Jordan and Riley, 
2015) and measures of the upside (e.g., Akbas and Genc, 2020). Our results on maximum 
drawdown are distinctive, however, because they show that (i) the impact of maximum drawdown 
is not subsumed by those other measures and (ii) the impact of maximum drawdown is present 




Bodnaruk, Chokaev, and Simonov (2019), who find that fund managers skilled in downside risk 
timing perform better and receive greater flows. 
Third and finally, our flow results speak in favor of the argument that, rather than 
efficiently process all relevant information before allocating capital, investors tend to focus on the 
highly salient information. Berk and van Binsbergen (2016) and Barber, Huang, and Odean (2016) 
both show that commonly available CAPM alphas, not multi-factor alphas, best explain net flows, 
and Evans and Sun (2020) show that investors better accounted for the size and value effects after 
Morningstar changed their methodology to account for those effects. The large impact of 
maximum drawdowns on flows fits well in this context, as maximum drawdowns are highly salient. 
Moreover, unlike the many salient, but seemingly irrational, drivers of flows (e.g., Cooper, Gulen, 
and Rau, 2005, and Solomon, Soltes, and Sosyura, 2014), the power of maximum drawdown to 
predict performance suggests that investors are rationally taking advantage of maximum 
drawdown’s wide availability. 
3.2. Data and methods 
3.2.1. Mutual fund sample 
We use the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free U.S. Mutual Fund database to build our sample of 
actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds. We drop the funds listed in CRSP as index funds, 
ETFs, or variable annuities; keep the funds with CRSP objective codes EDCI, EDCS, EDCM, 
EDYI, EDYB or EDYG; and require that the funds invest at least 70% of their assets in common 
stocks. We further use Lipper, Strategic Insight, and Wiesenberger investment objective codes to 
drop the funds not following a long-only strategy. To address incubation bias (Evans, 2010), we 
exclude a given fund from the sample until it is at least two years old and until it reaches at least 




WFICN variable available in MFLINKS. Fund-level assets are the sum across all share classes. 
Other fund-level data, such as net return, are asset-weighted averages of the share-level data.  
We use daily returns to compute funds’ maximum drawdowns. Because daily returns are 
not available in CRSP until September 1998, we begin our study in 1999. Our final sample, which 
spans from January 1999 to December 2019, has 2,185 unique funds and 262,921 fund-month 
observations. 
3.2.2. Measuring maximum drawdown 
We measure unadjusted maximum drawdown between time 0 and time T as: 
 
Unadjusted Maximum Drawdown = Max
X𝑡1 − X𝑡2
X𝑡1
  s. t.  0 ≤ 𝑡1 ≤ 𝑡2 ≤ 𝑇 (3.1) 
where X𝑡1 is the cumulative return from time 0 to time t1. At the beginning of each month, we 
calculate the unadjusted maximum drawdown of each mutual fund over the past 12 months. This 
unadjusted value is driven in significant part by a fund’s style, rather than a fund’s manager’s risk 
management skills. Therefore, to remove the style component, we subtract from each individual 
unadjusted value the mean unadjusted value during the same time period for all funds with the 
same style. We use this style-adjusted maximum drawdown (denoted simply as MDD) in all of 
our subsequent tests.56 
3.2.3. Risk-adjusting performance 
 We measure risk-adjusted mutual fund performance using daily fund returns and both the 
Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) four-factor model (henceforth, the FF4 model) and 
the Cremers, Petajisto, and Zitzewitz (2012) seven-factor model (henceforth, the CPZ7 model). 
 
56 This style-adjusted maximum drawdown should be salient to investors because Morningstar reports the MDD of 




We thank Ken French for making the FF4 factors available on his website 
(https://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html). The CPZ7 factors 
are calculated from benchmark returns available in Morningstar. We use net returns throughout 
our analysis, and to ease interpretation, we annualize the alphas from these models in our tables. 
3.3. The maximum drawdowns of mutual funds 
We begin our analyses by considering the size of the maximum drawdowns within our 
sample. Figure 3.1 plots the average unadjusted maximum drawdown in each year for the full 
sample of mutual funds and for subsamples of growth funds and income funds. As expected, there 
are significant fluctuations in unadjusted maximum drawdowns from 1999 to 2018. Full sample 
averages range from 50.4% in 2008 to 4.50% in 2017. There are also significant fluctuations 
between styles. The average unadjusted maximum drawdown of growth funds in 2001 was 12.85% 
greater than that of income funds, while in 2009 that difference was −3.41%. This variation shows 
the importance of our subsequent use of style-adjusted maximum drawdown. 
 Table 3.1, Panel A provides the characteristics of mutual funds in the highest and lowest 
quintiles of style-adjusted maximum drawdown. Low MDD funds, on average, have higher returns, 
higher alphas, and lower volatilities. They also tend to have lower turnover and expense ratios. If, 
as in Panel B, we focus on just the funds that are also in the top quintile of past performance—
measured over the previous 24 months using the CPZ7 model—low MDD funds continue to have 
lower average volatilities, turnover ratios, and expense ratios; however, there are no statistically 




3.4. Can maximum drawdown predict mutual fund performance? 
3.4.1. Returns and alphas 
We next consider the relation between past MDD and subsequent performance. Motivated 
by Cremer’s (2017) model of successful active management and empirical results from prior work 
(e.g., Amihud and Goyenko, 2013), we place a particular emphasis on the MDDs of mutual funds 
with relatively strong past performance. For these tests, we create a set of portfolios based on past 
performance and past MDD. We form those portfolios by first unconditionally sorting funds into 
quintiles at the beginning of each month based on their past 24-month CPZ7 alphas and past 
12-month MDDs. We then equal weight the funds in the resulting twenty-five groups. 
Our analysis of these portfolios begins by studying raw returns. Figure 3.2 shows the 
cumulative dollar returns on the five portfolios formed using the highest quintile of past 
performance. As past MDD decreases, the final portfolio values monotonically increase. A 
one-dollar investment made at the beginning of 2000 in the portfolio of the mutual funds in the 
highest past performance quintile and lowest past MDD quintile is, at the end of 2019, worth $6.80. 
In comparison, the portfolio of the funds in the highest past performance quintile and highest past 
MDD quintile is, at the end of 2019, worth only $2.43. 
This first test suggests MDD has predictive power with respect to performance, but it is far 
from conclusive. Raw returns do not account for the potentially large differences in factor exposure 
between the portfolios. To evaluate the risk-adjusted performance of the portfolios, we turn to the 
FF4 and CPZ7 models. Table 3.2 shows the alphas for all of the portfolios using each model (FF4 
in Panel A and CPZ7 in Panel B). There is some evidence that, unconditionally, mutual funds in 
the lowest past MDD quintile outperform—the FF4 alpha for the portfolio of those funds is 1.44% 




lowest past MDD quintile portfolios is not statistically different from zero. The evidence is much 
stronger after conditioning on past performance. The portfolio of the funds in the highest past 
performance quintile and lowest past MDD quintile has an FF4 alpha of 2.68% per year (t-stat = 
2.87) and a CPZ7 alpha of 2.09% per year (t-stat = 2.58). Moreover, that portfolio significantly 
outperforms (i) the portfolio formed using the funds from the top past performance quintile, but 
highest past MDD quintile, and (ii) the portfolio formed using the funds from the lowest past MDD 
quintile, but lowest past performance quintile. 
3.4.2. Subsequent MDD 
 If MDD is related to risk management skills, we would expect a fund’s MDD to persist. 
Table 3.3 examines the out-of-sample MDDs of the prior sub-section’s portfolios. From the results, 
it is clear that MDD persists. Setting aside past performance, the portfolio of the mutual funds in 
the lowest past MDD quintile has a subsequent average MDD of 14.53%, compared to 20.28% for 
the portfolios of the funds in the highest past MDD quintile. Within each quintile of past 
performance, there is a similar difference in out-of-sample MDD between the lowest and highest 
past MDD quintiles. The consistency of these results suggests that a low MDD is a not a random 
event, but rather an indicator of risk management skills.  
3.4.3. Market conditions 
 The previous results suggest that the mutual funds in the highest past performance quintile 
and lowest past MDD quintile have large subsequent alphas and low subsequent MDDs, which is 
an appealing combination. The performance of those funds, however, could vary substantially over 
time. As modeled by Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2017), fund managers are constrained by the 
non-constant number of profitable opportunities in their asset market. When the number of 




proxy for the number of profitable opportunities (or, alternatively, the turbulence of the market) 
using the von Reibnitz (2017) measure of cross-sectional return dispersion (RD). Von Reibnitz 
(2017) calculates RD in a given month as the standard deviation of the monthly returns on 
individual S&P 500 stocks. An increase in RD implies an increase in the number of profitable 
opportunities. 
 In Table 3.4, we first use one-month lagged RD to sort our time period in quintiles. Then, 
within each of the time period quintiles, we estimate the performance of the portfolio of the mutual 
funds in the highest past performance quintile and lowest past MDD quintile. As shown, the alpha 
of that portfolio varies substantially depending on market conditions, with alpha decreasing near 
monotonically as RD decreases. Within the highest RD quintile, the FF4 alpha is 5.21% per year 
(t-stat = 1.71), and the CPZ7 alpha is 4.17% per year (t-stat = 1.98). There are, conversely, no 
statistically significant alphas in the other market conditions. Within the lowest RD quintile, the 
FF4 alpha is −0.88% per year (t-stat = −1.14), and the CPZ7 alpha is −1.21% per year (t-stat = 
−1.20). In untabulated analysis, we find that this portfolio has a relatively low out-of-sample MDD 
regardless of market conditions, but with respect to overall risk-adjusted performance, these results 
indicate significant state dependence. 
3.4.4. What aspect of skill is MDD capturing? 
 Next, we investigate the relation between MDD and stock picking and market timing 
abilities. Either ability could be the channel through which risk management skills operate. A fund 
manager could be skilled at selecting the correct stocks to produce a portfolio with a low expected 
MDD, or they could be skilled at knowing when to limit the portfolio’s overall market exposure. 




Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and, and Wermers (1997) use mutual fund holdings data to 
generate two measures—“Characteristic Selectivity” (CS) and “Characteristic Timing” (CT)—that 
quantify the fund performance that comes from stock picking and market timing. If the managers 
of funds with low MDD have stock picking ability, then MDD should have a negative relation 
with CS. Likewise, if the managers of funds with low MDD have market timing ability, then MDD 
should have a negative relation with CT.  
We estimate the relation between MDD and CS using the model described in Eq. (3.2): 
CS𝑖,𝑡 = β0 + β1MDD𝑖,𝑡−1 + β2Perf𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ γ𝑗c𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐽
𝑗=1
+ FE + ε𝑖,𝑡 (3.2) 
CS𝑖,𝑡 is the annualized CS measure of fund i in month t and is computed following Daniel, Grinblatt, 
Titman and, and Wermers (1997). 57  MDD𝑖,𝑡−1  is the style-adjusted percentage maximum 
drawdown of fund 𝑖 over the twelve months ending with month t − 1. Perf𝑖,𝑡−1 is the performance 
of fund 𝑖  over the twelve months ending with month t − 1. We measure performance as the 
percentile ranking of the within-style cumulative net return, with a 100 given to the best performing 
fund and a zero given to the worst. c𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1 is the 𝑗th characteristic of fund 𝑖 as of the end of month 
t − 1. Characteristics in the model include the natural logarithm of fund age, the natural logarithm 
of fund assets, the natural logarithm of fund family assets, the expense ratio, and the turnover ratio. 
FE represents style fixed effects, and year-month fixed effects. The relation between MDD and 
CT is estimated analogously. 
Table 3.5 shows results from estimates of that model. Column (1) shows a negative relation 
between MDD and CS. A 10% increase in MDD is associated with a 1% decrease in annualized 
CS (t-stat = −2.31). That result suggests that the managers of funds with low MDD have greater 
 




stock selection skill than managers of funds with high MDD. Conversely, column (2) shows no 
significant relation between MDD and CT. The coefficient associated with MDD is economically 
and statistically zero, implying there is no difference in market timing skill between managers of 
funds with low and high MDD. Based on these results, we therefore conclude that the risk 
management skills of low MDD fund managers are primarily related to their ability to select 
individual stocks, not their ability to time the overall market. 
3.4.5. Uniqueness of MDD 
 Finally, we consider the utility of MDD as a performance predictor relative to other related 
measures. Our goal is to determine whether the predictive power of MDD is unique or if its power 
is subsumed by other previously analyzed measures. We focus on three previously analyzed 
measures: Jordan and Riley (2015) volatility (Vol), Artavanis, Eksi, and Kadlec (2019) downside 
beta (DBeta), and Akbas and Genc (2020) maximum return (MAX). With respect to performance, 
Vol is of the most interest because it alone among these measures has been previously shown to 
predict performance. The other measures are of more interest with respect to flows. 
 To establish a baseline, Panel A of Table 3.6 shows the alphas of equal weight portfolios 
formed using the mutual funds in the highest past performance quintile and a specific quintile of 
each of the measures. We use the lowest quintiles for MDD, Vol, and DBeta, and the highest 
quintile for MAX. Consistent with Jordan and Riley (2015), the portfolio of the funds in the lowest 
past Vol quintile does outperform, and consistent with Akbas and Genc (2020), the portfolio of 
the funds in the highest past MAX quintile does not outperform. Although Artavanis, Eksi, and 
Kadlec (2019) only focus on fund flows, we find DBeta also predicts performance. The portfolio 
of the funds in the lowest past DBeta quintile has an FF4 alpha of 2.46% per year (t-stat = 2.59) 




 Based on those results, it is reasonable to question whether MDD still has predictive power 
after accounting for Vol or DBeta. Table 3.6, Panel B speaks to that question by evaluating the 
performance of mutually exclusive portfolios. To explain by example, the ‘MDD excl. Vol’ 
portfolio consists only of the mutual funds in Panel A’s MDD-based portfolio that are not in Panel 
A’s Vol-based portfolio, and the ‘Vol excl. MDD’ portfolio consists only of the funds in the 
Vol-based portfolio that are not in MDD-based portfolio. Outperformance from the ‘MDD excl. 
Vol’ portfolio indicates that MDD has unique predictive power relative to Vol because the 
predictive power from Vol should be absent from that portfolio. 
 The mutually exclusive portfolios show that the predictive power of MDD is unique. Each 
of the ‘MDD excl.’  portfolios has an economically large and statistically significant alpha. For 
example, the ‘MDD excl. Vol’ portfolio has an FF4 alpha of 2.38% per year (t-stat = 2.18) and a 
CPZ7 alpha of 2.08% per year (t-stat = 2.08). MDD does not subsume the predictive power of Vol 
or DBeta, but these results suggest that MDD is able to detect outperforming mutual funds that are 
undetected by previously analyzed measures. 
3.5. Do investors respond to maximum drawdown? 
3.5.1. MDD-flow relation 
Investors are generally risk averse. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that, all other 
things equal, investors would prefer mutual funds that have not experienced large maximum 
drawdowns. If our previous performance results had shown that large maximum drawdowns in the 
past were predictive of outperformance in the future, that expectation would have to re-evaluated; 
however, we found that low maximum drawdowns in the past are actually predictive of 




investors respond to maximum drawdowns in reality by testing the relation between net fund flows 
and MDD. Our general model is: 
 
Flow𝑖,𝑡 = λ0 + λ1MDD𝑖,𝑡−1 + λ2Perf𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝑗c𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐽
𝑗=1
+ FE + ε𝑖,𝑡 (3.3) 
where Flow𝑖,𝑡 is the annualized percentage net flow of fund 𝑖 in month 𝑡. We calculate the net flow 
following Sirri and Tufano (1998). MDD𝑖,𝑡−1  is the style-adjusted percentage maximum 
drawdown of fund 𝑖 over the twelve months ending with month t − 1. Perf𝑖,𝑡−1 is the performance 
of fund i over the twelve months ending with month t – 1. We measure performance as the 
within-style cumulative net return percentile ranking, with a 100 given to the best performing fund 
and a zero given to the worst. To control for potential non-linearity in the flow-performance 
relation, we convert that measure of performance into piecewise performance measures styled after 
Sirri and Tufano (1998) in some model specifications. c𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1 is the 𝑗th characteristic of fund 𝑖 as 
of the end of month t – 1. Characteristics in the model include the natural logarithm of fund age, 
the natural logarithm of fund assets, the natural logarithm of fund family assets, the expense ratio, 
and the turnover ratio. FE represents style fixed effects, and year-month fixed effects. 
 Table 3.7 presents results from estimates of this model. Columns (1) and (2) show that, 
consistent with our initial expectation, flows have a negative relation with MDD. A 10% increase 
in MDD is associated with an annualized outflow of 4.8% (t-stat = −6.80) to 5.2% (t-stat = −7.38). 
In columns (3) and (4), we consider the expectation that the relation will be stronger among more 
risk averse investors. Relative to other equity styles, income funds should attract a more risk averse 
clientale; hence, we expect income funds to have a stronger flow response to MDD.  We test that 
hypothesis by interacting MDD with a dummy variable (Income) that is equal to one if the fund’s 




in MDD for income funds is associated with an annualized outflow 8.4% (t-stat = −3.06) to 8.7% 
(t-stat = −3.04) greater than that of funds following other styles. Therefore, we conclude that the 
relation between flows and MDD is stronger among more risk averse investors. 
While investors vary cross-sectionally in their risk aversion, the general level of investor 
risk aversion also varies over time. Wang and Young (2020) show that the general level of investor 
risk aversion is higher when there have been a greater number of recent terrorist attacks, so we 
expect that the strength of the negative flow-MDD relation will vary with that trend. Specifically, 
when there have been a greater number of recent terrorist attacks, the flow-MDD relation will be 
stronger. To test that hypothesis, we interact MDD with the z-score of the number of recent terrorist 
attacks in the world that involve human casualties or injuries.58 Column (5) shows that flow-MDD 
relation is indeed stronger when there have been a greater number of recent terrorist attacks. A one 
standard deviation increase in attacks increases the coefficient associated with MDD by about 20% 
(=−0.11/−0.56) to 23% (=−0.12/−0.52). From these results, we conclude that the strength of the 
flow-MDD relation does vary depending on the general level of investor risk aversion. 
 The final two columns of Table 3.7 consider how MDD effects the shape of the 
flow-performance relation. We expect that investors will discount highly ranked performance if 
that performance is accompanied by large drawdown risk. We test this hypothesis by interacting 
our performance measures with a dummy variable (High MDD) that is equal to one if MDD is 
within the highest MDD quintile. As shown in column (8), the flow-performance relation is flatter 
for mutual funds with high MDD. Compared to other funds, the flows of funds with high MDD 
respond relatively more to lowly ranked performance (Low Perf) and relatively less to highly 
ranked performance (High Perf). Among funds with highly ranked performance, when MDD is 
 




high the responsiveness of flows to an increase in performance is reduced by 26% (=0.26/0.99). 
Thus, consistent with our expectation, investors do discount the highly ranked performance of 
funds subject to large drawdown risk. 
3.5.2. MDD uniqueness 
We finally consider how the MDD-flow relation is affected by the inclusion of our earlier 
set of previously analyzed measures (Vol, DBeta, and MAX). Our general model is the same as in 
the previous sub-section, except for the inclusion of those variables. The goal of this test is to 
determine whether the impact of MDD on flows is unique or if it is subsumed by already known 
relations. 
Table 3.8 shows the results from this test. Columns (1) through (3) show that the impact of 
MDD on flows is not subsumed by Vol, but that the impact of Vol is subsumed by MDD. Jordan 
and Riley (2015) did not consider the Vol-flow relation, so these results do not overturn previous 
results, but they are nevertheless notable. Given that Vol and MDD have similar saliency—they 
are listed on the same page on Morningstar’s website—this result suggests investors weight the 
specific component of risk captured by MDD more heavily than the more general component of 
risk captured by Vol. Conversely, columns (4) through (9) show that MDD’s impact on flows is 
not subsumed by DBeta or MAX, and that DBeta’s and MAX’s impacts are not subsumed by 
MDD. These results suggest that investors, as a group, are not myopic when allocating capital. 
They consider multiple components of each fund’s history. 
3.6. Conclusion 
 We evaluate the importance of mutual fund managers’ risk management skills—as 
quantified by styled-adjusted maximum drawdown. We find that a fund’s past maximum 




give considerable weight to a fund’s past maximum drawdown when allocating capital. Among 
funds with relatively strong past performance, those with relatively low past maximum drawdowns 
have an average FF4 alpha of 2.68% per year (t-stat = 2.87). That result, in conjunction with the 
persistence in funds’ maximum drawdowns, suggests that having a low maximum drawdown is a 
signal of fund manager risk management skills. The gains to investors from those skills tend to 
vary over time, with most of the gains being realized during turbulent market conditions. Further, 
we find that low MDD is associated with stock picking skill but not market timing skill. 
Given those results, it is not surprising that we find that (i) there is a strong negative relation 
between fund flows and maximum drawdowns, particularly among more risk averse investors and 
during periods of generally heightened risk aversion, and (ii) investors discount the 
outperformance of funds that have had relatively large maximum drawdowns. Considered as a 
whole, our paper demonstrates that mutual fund managers’ risk management skill—an important, 
but understudied, skill in the literature—has a significant and unique influence on mutual fund 





Table 3.1: Characteristics of mutual funds with low and high MDD 
This table presents mean characteristics for mutual funds in the top and bottom quintiles of past 
style-adjusted maximum drawdown (MDD). Panel A shows the characteristics for all funds, 
unconditional on past performance. Panel B shows the characteristics after excluding all funds not 
in the top quintile of past performance. The t-statistics associated with the differences are 
calculated using standard errors clustered on fund and year-month. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Panel A: Full Sample 
  Low MDD  High MDD Difference t-statistic All 
Unadjusted MDD (%) 13.34 23.27 -9.93*** -19.48 17.44 
MDD (%) -4.59 5.51 -10.10*** -20.78 0.00 
Return (%) 12.26 4.37 7.89*** 9.15 8.34 
Volatility (%) 16.96 22.42 -5.46*** -12.70 19.08 
Age (months) 212.44 205.04 7.41 1.25 218.21 
Asset (millions) 1,780.23 1,155.29 624.93*** 2.97 1,669.45 
Family Asset (millions) 90,335.90 82,591.49 7,744.40 0.80 103,913.10 
Expense (%) 1.16 1.30 -0.14*** -9.54 1.18 
Turnover (%) 61.77 94.39 -32.62*** -11.89 76.05 
FF4 Alpha (%) 1.08 -2.47 3.55*** 9.96 -0.79 
CPZ7 Alpha (%) 1.14 -2.46 3.60*** 12.29 -0.85 
 
Panel B: Top Performing Funds 
  Low MDD  High MDD Difference t-statistic All 
Unadjusted MDD (%) 13.97 22.9 -8.93*** -10.73 16.95 
MDD (%) -5.03 5.79 -10.82*** -18.28 -1.00 
Return (%) 14.69 14.49 0.20 0.11 14.28 
Volatility (%) 17.96 23.59 -5.63*** -6.46 19.75 
Age (months) 206.49 188.63 17.87** 2.18 205.58 
Asset (millions) 1,900.06 1,420.05 480.01* 1.81 1,871.08 
Family Asset (millions) 88,178.14 77,335.76 10,842.38 0.79 103,608.30 
Expense (%) 1.18 1.33 -0.16*** -6.27 1.21 
Turnover (%) 56.87 91.84 -34.96*** -8.82 70.13 
FF4 Alpha (%) 5.26 4.73 0.53 0.63 4.67 





Table 3.2: Alphas of portfolios formed based on past performance and MDD 
This table shows the alphas of equal weight portfolios formed by the unconditional quintile sorting 
of mutual funds based on past performance and past style-adjusted maximum drawdown (MDD). 
Panel A measures the portfolios’ alphas using the FF4 model, while Panel B uses the CPZ7 model. 
The alphas are measured over the time period January 2000 to December 2019. t-statistics are in 
brackets below each coefficient. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels. 
Panel A: FF4 Alpha 
  MDD Quintile 
Alpha Quintile 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 (High) Low − High All 
5 (High) 2.68*** 1.17 0.55 0.12 -2.25* 4.93*** 0.77 
 [2.87] [1.54] [0.71] [0.12] [-1.67] [3.04] [1.16] 
4 1.13 1.87 -0.38 -1.23* -2.11* 3.24** 0.22 
 [1.64] [1.32] [-0.80] [-1.68] [-1.65] [2.21] [0.38] 
3 1.85 -0.35 -0.48 -1.08* -2.57** 4.42** -0.52 
 [1.14] [-0.70] [-0.98] [-1.68] [-2.32] [2.20] [-1.08] 
2 -0.08 -0.70 -1.36** -1.80*** -2.62** 2.54** -1.36** 
 [-0.10] [-1.16] [-2.54] [-3.27] [-2.46] [2.00] [-2.58] 
1 (Low) -0.13 -1.55** -1.68** -1.83** 0.92 -1.05 -0.09 
 [-0.17] [-2.15] [-2.27] [-2.49] [0.21] [-0.23] [-0.04] 
High − Low 2.81*** 2.72*** 2.24*** 1.95** -3.17  0.85 
 [3.15] [3.72] [2.76] [2.02] [-0.72] 
 [0.38] 
All 1.44* 0.28 -0.69 -1.26** -0.75 2.19 -0.20 
  [1.94] [0.45] [-1.37] [-2.18] [-0.31] [0.86] [-0.29] 
 
Panel B: CPZ7 Alpha 
  MDD Quintile 
Alpha Quintile 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 (High) Low − High All 
5 (High) 2.09** 0.80 0.59 -0.03 -1.46 3.55** 0.70 
 [2.58] [1.41] [1.01] [-0.04] [-1.21] [2.16] [1.51] 
4 0.37 1.04 -0.66* -1.59*** -2.21** 2.58* -0.30 
 [0.73] [0.97] [-1.84] [-2.67] [-2.03] [1.88] [-0.81] 
3 0.42 -0.83** -0.93** -1.49*** -2.51** 2.93* -1.05*** 
 [0.39] [-2.02] [-2.56] [-2.97] [-2.57] [1.75] [-3.50] 
2 -1.10* -1.33*** -1.82*** -2.04*** -2.44*** 1.35 -1.79*** 
 [-1.84] [-2.84] [-4.28] [-4.57] [-2.68] [1.11] [-4.90] 
1 (Low) -0.92 -1.89*** -2.22*** -2.14*** 1.39 -2.31 -0.23 
 [-1.22] [-3.05] [-3.80] [-3.76] [0.30] [-0.48] [-0.10] 
High − Low 3.00*** 2.69*** 2.80*** 2.11** -2.85  0.93 
 [3.31] [3.75] [3.39] [2.46] [-0.61] 
 [0.39] 
All 0.61 -0.27 -1.06*** -1.56*** -0.39 0.99 -0.53 





Table 3.3: MDDs of portfolios formed based on past performance and MDD 
This table shows the average annual unadjusted maximum drawdowns of equal weight portfolios 
formed by the unconditional quintile sorting of mutual funds based on past performance and past 
MDD. The portfolio MDDs are measured over the time period 2000 to 2019. t-statistics are in 
brackets below each coefficient. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels. 
  MDD Quintile 
Alpha Quintile 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 (High) Low − High All 
5 (High) 14.80*** 15.98*** 17.25*** 18.47*** 21.32*** -6.52*** 16.83*** 
 [6.70] [6.48] [6.77] [6.60] [6.83] [-4.16] [6.93] 
4 14.45*** 15.36*** 16.24*** 17.44*** 20.11*** -5.66*** 15.98*** 
 [6.46] [6.50] [6.55] [6.51] [6.61] [-3.86] [6.62] 
3 14.45*** 15.34*** 16.02*** 16.89*** 19.83*** -5.38*** 15.98*** 
 [6.56] [6.36] [6.35] [6.41] [6.55] [-3.72] [6.49] 
2 14.39*** 15.31*** 16.04*** 17.10*** 19.93*** -5.54*** 16.50*** 
 [6.40] [6.40] [6.44] [6.48] [6.73] [-4.11] [6.49] 
1 (Low) 14.55*** 16.00*** 16.68*** 17.39*** 20.37*** -5.82*** 17.74*** 
 [6.41] [6.40] [6.45] [6.48] [6.86] [-3.92] [6.59] 
High − Low 0.25 -0.03 0.57 1.07** 0.95  -0.91 
 [0.59] [-0.07] [1.00] [2.32] [1.70]  [-1.72] 
All 14.53*** 15.49*** 16.24*** 17.27*** 20.28*** -5.76*** 16.54*** 




Table 3.4: Performance as a function of market conditions 
This table shows the FF4 and CPZ7 alphas of a portfolio formed by the unconditional quintile 
sorting of mutual funds based on past performance and past style-adjusted maximum drawdown 
(MDD). The portfolio evaluated consists of the funds in both the lowest past MDD quintile and 
the highest past performance quintile. The time period of January 2000 to December 2019 is 
divided into quintiles based on one-month lagged von Reibnitz (2017) cross-sectional return 
dispersion (RD). t-statistics are in brackets below each coefficient. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
RD Quintile FF4 Alpha CPZ7 Alpha 
5 (High) 5.21* 4.17* 
 [1.71] [1.98] 
4 2.50 2.92 
 [1.13] [0.95] 
3 0.21 0.28 
 [0.24] [0.31] 
2 0.14 0.58 
 [0.13] [0.61] 
1 (Low) -0.88 -1.21 
 [-1.14] [-1.20] 
High − Low 6.09* 5.38** 
 [1.93] [2.31] 
All 2.68*** 2.09** 





Table 3.5: What aspects of skill is MDD capturing? 
This table shows estimates of Eq. (3.2), which is our model of the relation between “Characteristic 
Selectivity” (CS) and “Characteristic Timing (CT)” measures of Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and, 
and Wermers (1997) and lagged style-adjusted maximum drawdown (MDD). All the results 
include lagged fund characteristics as controls and use style fixed effects, and year-month fixed 
effects. The standard errors are clustered by fund and year-month. t-statistics are in brackets below 
each coefficient. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
  (1) (2) 
 CS CT 
      
MDD -0.10** -0.01 
 [-2.31] [-0.42] 
Ln(Age) 0.01 0.01 
 [0.29] [0.36] 
Ln(Assets) -0.07*** 0.00 
 [-2.61] [0.02] 
Ln(Family Assets) 0.04** 0.00 
 [1.98] [0.42] 
Expense  -0.01 0.02 
 [-0.06] [0.30] 
Turnover  -0.00 -0.00 
 [-0.87] [-0.35] 
Perf 0.00 0.00 
 [0.79] [1.11] 
   
Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 219,062 219,062 








Table 3.6: Comparison of MDD and other measures as performance predictors 
This table shows, in Panel A, the FF4 and CPZ7 alphas of equal weight portfolios formed by the unconditional quintile sorting of mutual 
funds based on past performance and another measure. The ‘Low MDD’, ‘Low Vol’, and ‘Low DBeta’ portfolios use the funds in both 
the lowest quintiles of those respective measures and the highest quintile of past performance. The ‘High MAX’ portfolio uses the funds 
in both the highest quintile of MAX and the highest quintile of past performance. Panel B shows the alphas for mutually exclusive equal 
weight portfolios formed based on the overlap between the funds in the preceding portfolios. ‘MDD excl. Vol’, for example, consists of 
the funds in the ‘Low MDD’ portfolio that are not in the ‘Low Vol’ portfolio. The ‘Distinctive’ row reports the percentage of funds that 
are included in only that particular portfolio among the set of funds that are included in at least one of the two portfolios. All of the 
alphas in both panels are measured over the time period January 2000 to December 2019. t-statistics are in brackets below each 
coefficient. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Panel A: Performance of Individual Portfolios 
  Low MDD Low Vol Low DBeta High MAX 
FF4 Alpha 2.68*** 2.83*** 2.46** 0.42 
 [2.87] [3.15] [2.59] [0.48] 
CPZ7 Alpha 2.09** 1.71** 1.32* 0.78 
  [2.58] [2.53] [1.88] [1.17] 
 



















FF4 Alpha 2.38**  3.19***  2.97**  1.81*  2.50**  -0.74 
 [2.18]  [3.06]  [2.22]  [1.80]  [2.41]  [-0.66] 
CPZ7 Alpha 2.08**  1.94***  2.68**  0.77  1.90**  -0.05 
 [2.08]  [2.62]  [2.15]  [1.03]  [2.08]  [-0.06] 








Table 3.7: MDD-flow relation 
This table shows estimates of Eq. (3.3), which is our model of the relation between net mutual fund flows and style-adjusted maximum 
drawdown (MDD). For brevity, the variables related to fund characteristics are suppressed in the table. Columns (5) and (6) use style 
fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The other columns use style fixed effects, and year-month fixed effects. The standard errors are 
clustered by fund and year-month. t-statistics are in brackets below each coefficient. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
MDD -0.48*** -0.52*** -0.45*** -0.49*** -0.52*** -0.56***   
 [-6.80] [-7.38] [-6.38] [-6.97] [-7.37] [-7.77]   
MDD * Income   -0.87*** -0.84***     
   [-3.04] [-3.06]     
MDD * Attack     -0.12* -0.11   
     [-1.84] [-1.57]   
Attack     0.77 0.76   
     [0.69] [0.68]   
Perf 0.29***  0.29***  0.29***  0.31***  
 [30.15]  [30.01]  [29.92]  [32.02]  
Low Perf  0.43***  0.42***  0.41***  0.33*** 
  [12.25]  [12.17]  [11.98]  [8.11] 
Mid Perf  0.19***  0.19***  0.19***  0.21*** 
  [19.10]  [19.07]  [19.22]  [21.32] 
High Perf  0.93***  0.93***  0.93***  0.99*** 
  [19.81]  [19.80]  [19.87]  [20.05] 
Perf * High MDD       -0.02*  
       [-1.75]  
Low Perf * High MDD       0.24*** 
        [3.88] 
Mid Perf * High MDD       -0.04*** 
        [-2.58] 
High Perf * High MDD       -0.26*** 
        [-2.65] 
High MDD       -2.19*** -6.27*** 
       [-3.63] [-5.96] 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 238,292 238,292 238,292 238,292 238,292 238,292 238,292 238,292 







Table 3.8: Relation between flows, MDD, and MDD-related measures 
This table shows estimates from an expansion of our Eq. (3.3), which is our model of the relation between net mutual fund flows and 
style-adjusted maximum drawdown (MDD). In this instance, we also add Vol, DBeta, and Max to the model. For brevity, the variables 
related to fund characteristics are suppressed in the table. The standard errors are clustered by fund and year-month. t-statistics are in 
brackets below each coefficient. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
MDD  -0.42*** -0.43***  -0.16* -0.20**  -0.55*** -0.55*** 
  [-4.29] [-4.34]  [-1.92] [-2.38]  [-7.39] [-7.59] 
Vol -0.42*** -0.09 -0.14       
 [-4.19] [-0.63] [-0.95]       
DBeta    -12.03*** -11.04*** -10.97***    
    [-6.57] [-5.46] [-5.44]    
MAX       0.47*** 0.75*** 0.37*** 
       [3.29] [5.19] [2.58] 
Perf 0.31*** 0.29***  0.30*** 0.29***  0.30*** 0.27***  
 [33.70] [31.63]  [32.70] [30.95]  [34.03] [28.91]  
Low Perf   0.44***   0.46***   0.43*** 
   [12.93]   [13.15]   [12.42] 
Mid Perf   0.19***   0.19***   0.18*** 
   [20.40]   [19.40]   [18.86] 
High Perf   0.94***   0.93***   0.90*** 
   [19.62]   [20.04]   [19.09] 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 238,292 238,292 238,292 238,292 238,292 238,292 238,292 238,292 238,292 









Figure 3.1: Average unadjusted maximum drawdown of mutual funds 
This figure presents the average unadjusted maximum drawdown for all sample mutual funds. It also presents results for subsamples of 
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Figure 3.2: Cumulative return on portfolios formed based on past performance and MDD 
This figure shows the changing value of a $1 investment made in five different portfolios from January 2000 to December 2019. The 
portfolios are equal weighted and formed by sorting mutual funds unconditionally on past performance and past style-adjusted maximum 
drawdown (MDD). The ‘Low MDD’ portfolio consists of the funds in the highest quintile of past performance and lowest quintile of 
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